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Executive Summary
Throughout the world, governments are This study has been developed in the
moving from being exclusively service context of a sector wide approach for the
delivery organiizations and toward improving HFNP sector and an overall GOB strategy. It
their public health sector management and includes targeting mechanisms, private
stewardship capacity. To diversify service investment promotion in underserved areas,
provision, the Bangladesh Ministry of Health interventions where private sector has
and Family Welfare (MOHFW) is striving to comparative advantages to complement
develop its capability to become active public service delivery, more effective
service purchasers in partnership with NGOs management in quality control and response
and private (for-profit) providers. to client needs, and outcome evaluation and
regulation.
Contracting has become a sustainable
strategy to diversify health care service The report includes an examination of
provision. Contracting provides greater contractual provisions for altemative
emplhasis on outputs and results, increased contracting options that are currently used in
autonomiiy allowing providers to respond the HNP sector to procure NGO services, and
quickly to evolving situations, and more also proposes a set of criteria to assess these
flexible working arrangemenits and incentives provisions, taking into consideration equity
for staff and providers to achieve social goals and financial sustainability concerns.
targets. Since implementation risks exist, it An analysis was done to assess the
is essential to design policy strategies to performance of various NGO contracting
overcome those risks. modalities with regards to the bidding and
selection process, flexibility of decision-
Potential contracting risks may include: making, monitoring and supervision, quality
cost overruns in the absence of specific well- assurance, NGOs in the Bangladesh HNP
defined services; payment meclhaniismiis sector are also mapped and classified to
creating prejudicial reactions of providers indicate the services that NGOs are currently
who seek to maximize their benefits; and a providing.
weakeniing of capacity to regulate services
leading to less desirable quality standards. This review has identified a number of
potential areas where improvements might be
This study was designed to assist the made, together with suggested actions for
MOfI FW in its future decision to scale up the future contractinig arrangements. For
commiiissioninig of NGOs and the private example, there is widespread lack of
sector to deliver HNP services, and to performance monitorinig or incentives for
provide guidanice to the World Bank in the good provider and NGO staff performance.
preparation of the next IDA credit support for Furthenmore, the NGOs have limited
the Bangladeslh Health. Nutrition and understanidinig about the importance of
Population Sector Program (HINPSP). A service provision witlh regards to professional
great deal ot'effort has been made to improve liability, enhancement of efficiency, financial
our understandinig of the political economy sustainability and management oversight.
of chanige related to the diversification of
healtlh care provision, and to take into The lesson leamt for contracting HNP
account possible related repercussions, services is that key guidelines need to be
particularlv with a focus on the sequencing followed to reduce the likelihood of incurring
and timing of the process. system losses and to ensure smooth delivery
I
NGO Contracting Evaluation for the HNP Sector in Bangladesh
of services to the poor. The main criteria for The proposed contracting arrangements
contracting include: (a) competitive bidding include the MOHFW engaging through anto select the NGO providers; (b) social international competitive process a
accountability through community Management Support Agency to diversifyparticipation; (c) accreditation systems; (d) service provision. The MSA would beperformance monitoring/accountability; (e) responsible for deciding what services to
effective payment mechanisms; (f) retention contract out, from whom to purchase HNP
of user fees; (g) link between performance and HNP related services, defining the
and payments; (h) staff and provider contract payment option, negotiating theincentives; (i) training; (j) past performance terms of the contract with the selected
regarding project/program implementation; provider, monitoring the performance of the(k) the maturity and strength of the contracted provider, modifying contracts
management information system (MIS); (I) based on performance, and promoting thefiduciary arrangements: (m) methods to formation of public and private healthimprove equity, access and financial networks at the union level. Special financial
sustainability; (n) capacity of the accounting management and disbursement arrangements
system; (o) measures of cost-effectiveness will need to be made for this agency,
and efficiency; and (p) overhead and including a special account to administer the
administrative costs and provisions. funds dedicated to the diversification of
service provision.
By evaluating several NGO contracting
modalities, we were able to define some pre- The main finding from this study is that
conditions for a successful contracting contracting out HINP services should beprocess in the near future. The findings adopted when society will benefit. This study
suggest various legal and institutional issues explores a number of options to achieve thisthat can enhance NGOs' performance. The objective and proposes the establishment of
recommendations include the establishment contracting arrangements with features that
of a private institution, a Management enhance transparency and improveSupport Agency (MSA), to manage the performance, thus providing a sustainable
contracting, monitoring and financing of solution for service provision in the medium
non-government and private providers. The as well as the long term.
MSA would lead the process of contracting,
assisted by other accreditation, supervision
and consumer rights agencies.
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Introduction complementary to achieving its objectives.
The first objective being to strengthen and
Objectives expand the framework for contracting non-
public providers with public funding from
This study was designed to assist the the GOB and the pool financiers to increase
MOHFW in its decision to scale up the the provision of HNP services in poor
diversification of HINP service provision, and underserved areas. The second objective is
to provide guidance to the World Bank in the to build the MOHFW's stewardship function,
preparation of the next IDA credit support to which includes improving the quality of care
the Bangladesh Health, Nutrition and provided by non-public providers directly to
Population Sector Program (HNPSP). A protect the interest of users; stimulating
great deal of effort has been made to improve competition in the provision of HNP
our understanding of the political economy services; and promoting training to improve
of change related to the diversification of the functioning of the private sector. In sum,
health care provision, and to take into the overall objective of the GOB is to support
account possible repercussions, particularly building national health capacity to deliver
in the sequencing and timing of the process. HNP services effectively and efficiently to all
its citizens, particularly the poor.
The report reviews local and international
NGO contracting experiences to examine The GOB acknowledges that the
what works and what does not. NGOs diversification of service provision through
operating in the HNP sector in Bangladesh contracting-out non-public providers can
are mapped and classified to indicate the yield many important outcomes. First,
services they currently provide. In addition, access to health care services can be
the study examines existing NGO contractual extended to a larger share of the poor and
provisions to assess possible contracting populations at risk. Second, coverage
arrangements the government can adopt to provided by public health facilities can be
work effectively with NGOs and the private complemented by the comparative
sector. It also proposes a set of criteria to advantages of non-public providers. Third,
assess these provisions, taking into contracting with NGOs can improve service
consideration equity goals and financial quality and efficiency with particular
sustainability concerns. Finally, the study's attention to the needs of the poor, as has been
main goal was to recommend strategies for demonstrated in other countries in the region,
formulating an efficient and sustainable e.g., Cambodia and Laos,' Fourth, private
institutional arrangement to contract non- providers can focus their attention on priority
government providers to deliver HNP public health programs with incentives
services to the poor. embodied within a contractual framework.
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Fifth, diversification can address specific
Situation Analysis tasks for which the government lacks
capacity. Sixth, contracting can provide
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare's greater incentives and compensation to health
(MOHFW) Strategic Investment Plan (SIP) workers to improve their job performance as
2003-2010 includes the policy decision to well as the quality of service delivery to poor
diversify service provision by means of NGO and vulnerable users who lack access to
and private sector services. The MOHFW care.3 Finally, private providers focus more
acknowledges that the diversification of on outputs and results.
service provision and increasing the
stewardship role of the government are The public system for health services
3
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provision is grossly inefficient. 4 It breeds better planning, resulting in greater efficiency
low productivity, and a lack of and improved quality. As McCombs and
responsiveness and accountability. The 2003 Christianson (1987) observed, contracting is
Service Delivery Survey found that only 10 a means for government to introduce market
percent of households used the public sector mechanisms---competitive bidding, financial
services for treatment (a drop from 13 incentives and performance measures---
percent in 1999). The non-public sector without sacrificing the provision of essential(including NGOs) accounted for about 49 public health services and protecting the
percent usage by households. A recent needs of the poor and vulnerable. Moreover,
survey of Bangladeshi public health facilities contracting allows for greater flexibility and
reveals a doctor absenteeism rate of over 42 more autonomy for providers to respond to
percent, with the absentee rate of doctors at changing conditions faster and to explore
the rural primary health facilities (i.e., the innovative methods. Nevertheless,
Upgraded Family Welfare Centers) even contracting is by no means a panacea.
higher at 74 percent.5 User satisfaction with Contracting has inherent challenges
health services is fast emerging as a key issue associated with accountability, transparency,
in the sector as well. Only 54 percent of monitoring and evaluation, as well as the
service users expressed satisfaction with the implementation of cost-effective
overall service received from public interventions. The diversification of service
providers compared to 88 percent of users provision through contracting is a complex
who are satisfied with the services of private process. It requires substantial govemment(for-profit) and NGO providers.6  and provider capacity and an enabling
environment to forge and sustain partnerships
The poor are inadequately reached by the between the public and the private sector to
public sector. The richest 10 percent of the improve coverage of quality services for the
population are the largest beneficiary group, poor.
using 16.4 percent of the public health
facilities expenditure, while the poorest 10 Method
percent account for only around 7.8 percent.
In comparison, at NGO health facilities the Several field instruments were utilized to
poorest 10 percent of the population use obtain information from users and personnel,
about 14 percent and the richest 10 percent and about facility characteristics. Key NGOs
use about 11 percent of the NGO working under four contracting models were
expenditures respectively.7  selected, and a semi-structured guideline was
designed for conducting in depth one-to-one
The public sector's insufficient discussion with NGO managers and public
performance along with users' growing officials. To assess the NGO models, thedissatisfaction with govemment health survey team visited 53 health centers of the
services warrant increased efforts to find 16 selected NGOs to gather information from
alternatives to direct government facility personnel about their opinions on
provisioning. This will require the service delivery and the NGOs' practices
govemnmenit to move away from its (173 interviews), as well as client opinions
traditional role as a service provider and to (1,224 interviews). See Annex I for the exit
adopt more of a stewardship role for the interview with clients, NGO facility surveys,
entire sector. Contracting provides a method interviews with NGO facility personnel, and
for the government to exercise the role of surveys with NGO managers and partners.
steward, and to purchase services in an The survey team held focus group
orderly and disciplined way. 8 It may also discussions with 93 public officials, health
serve as an important tool to harness private professionals and NGO managers.
sector resources and contracting promotes Household, income, and expenditure surveys
4
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were used to describe results of benefit The findings of the comparative advantage
incidence analysis. To evaluate NGO analysis are shown for NGOs, public and
performance, i.e., perceived quality, technical private providers at the upazila level in terms
quality, price, accessibility and cost relative of quality, cost, pricing and accessibility. The
to the public and private sector providers at primary source of information for this task
the upazila9 level, a sample of 50 facilities consists of a sample of 50 facilities.
(public and private providers) were used.
Data was collected through the following This chapter also presents policy options
nine instruments: facility survey (1) exit poll for public and private partnerships,
outpatients, (2) exit poll inpatients and direct specifically with regards to what to do and
observation of (3) antenatal care, (4) ARI (5) how to do it to move forward on
hypertension, (6) Normal Delivery (7) C- strengthening the govemment's stewardship
Section, and (8) severe diarrhea for public, role and on publicly financing the NGO and
and (9) severe diarrhea for private providers. private sector to promote diversification of
See Annex 3 (' HNP service provision.
Content of the Study Finally, Chapter 4 presents the
conclusions and recommendations.
This report is divided into four chapters.
Chapter I is an overview of the current role
of NGOs in the Bangladesh health sector and
maps the NGOs HNP service provision.
Chapter 2 reviews the lessons leamt from the
national NGO contracting experiences.
Chapter 3 describes the perfom-lance of
selected NGO contracting models and draws
lessons learnt using specific criteria related to
legal framework and governance aspects,
bidding and selection process, flexibility of
contracts, supervision and regular monitoring
and evaluation, service quality, the
accessibility of the poor to services, user
satisfaction, opinlioIns of NGO facility
personnel, etc.
5
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Chapter 1. Role of NGOs in HNP Service Delivery in
Bangladesh
This chapter is ani overview and maps the NGOs in the HNP sector in Bangladesh vwith regard to
NGO financing and expenditures, staffing, type of services and quality, as well as the capacity of
NGOs to provide services to the poor.
1.1. Mapping NGO Activity in
Bangladesh The contracted manager model, such as the
About 769 NGOs worked in the Bangladesh NSDP and the BPHC, operates in a large
HNP sector from 2003-2004. The number of number of Thanas: the NSDP in 223 and the
NGOs has been increasing at a relatively rapid BPHC in 63 Thanas respectively. Both the
pace over the past few years. Table 1.1 shows National Nutrition Project (NNP) and the
the distribution of NGOs by Bangladeshi Urban Primary Health Care Project (UPHCP)
Divisions. About 70 percent of all Thanas are examples of the direct GOB control model
have NGOs involved in HNP activities."1  covering 206 Thanas in 2004.12
Table 1.1. Number of Thanas with at Least One NGO Working in the HNP Sector
DIVISION COVERAGE NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENT
THANAS THANAS WITH NGO COVERAGE
ACTIVITIES
Dhaka 134 114 85.1
Chittagong 93 59 64.4
Rajshahi 127 84 66.1
Khulna 63 44 69.8
Barisal 38 16 42.1
Sylhet 35 33 94.3
TOTAL 490 350 71.4
Source: An Evaluation of NGO contracting in Bangladesh: Contracting NGO for the delivery of health services, AUS
Health International in association with ADSL. Report commissioned by the World Bank, November 2004.
1.2. NGO Profile in the HNP Sector
The NGOs average annual expenditure on
1.2.1. NGO Financing and Expenditures HNP activities is estimated at US$125 million
(equivalent to 8.4% of the total health
Financing expenditures), of which DP financed 73%, the
GOB 18% and NGOs own resources 9%
The increase in NGO service delivery funded (Figure 1.1).'3 The current NGO expenditure
by direct DP financial support and public represents an increase from the 6% of total
sources has been in response to the need to health expenditures registered by the
improve the quality of HNP service delivery, Bangladesh National Health Account in 1996-
particularly in poor underserved areas. 1998 (NHA-1).
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Figure 1.1. NGO Funding of HNP Expenditures Figure 1.2. No. of NGO Outdoor Service Centers and
by Source, average for 1999-00 and 2001-02 No. of Out-Patient Visits to NGO Facilities
16000- 
- --NG(s 15.1 m-
1. 14000 -
604m4 12000 - N
H 10000GOB3 (90) 
-
Tk. E 8000
l,224m. 6000
(18% ~~2W ~4000 
-
2000 -W ~DPs-
T k. 1999-2000 2000-2001 2012
4,950m. f No. of outdoor services centers of NGOS
(73) 
.
of ouout-patient visits to NGOfacilities
Source: Bangladesh National Health Accounts 1999-2001. Source: Bangladesh National Health Accounts 1999-2001.
HEU, MOHFW, 2003. HEU, MOHFW, 2003
Expenditures for a normal delivery and Tk.4,000 to Tk.6,000
for a c-section.
The num-ber of out-patient visits to NGOs
increased from 12.2 million in 1999-2000 to 1.2.2. Type of Services aid Mode ofDelivery:
15.1 million in 2001-02, while the number of
NGO outdoor service centers increased from From 1999 to 2001, NGOs concentrated their
6,501 to 7,947 over the same period (Figure expenses in a few key areas of healthcare. Family
1.2). The bulk of the NGO's clients are women planninig had the largest share of expenditures
and children.'4 Out-patient services account for with 25%, followed by general health ('"' 1
on average 41 percent of the IINP expenditures matemal and child health (20%), communicable
of NGOs. On average about 90 percent of the diseases (I17%), training (11%) and immunization
outdoor services are provided by small and (7%) (See figure 1.3). However, NHA-2
medium NGOs. estimated that the very large NGOs provided
59% of the NGOs activities.' 6
Fees
Figure 1.3. Average HNP Expenditure of NGOs by
The facility questionnaire' 5 includes health Area of Healthcare, for 1999-00 and 2001-02
center managers' reporting on thie percent of
clients exempted from fee payment. Family
planning (permanent method) and child
immunization show the highest degree of Immunization Family
exemptions. More than 80% of individuals Training 7% planning
receiving permanent family plaining method are I 1 . 25%
exempted from payment. NGOs also exempt a
significant number of clienits for general Cmuial
consultationi services. Both the UPHCP and diseases General
NSDP-BPHC NGOs reported exempting about 170/;1 Maternal health
50%o of clients from payment for general & Child 20%Healthconsultation and about 20% for specialized 20%/o
consultation. The exemption rates are lowest for
nomial and c-section deliveries, with NGOs Source: Bangladesh National Health Accounts 1999-2001,
charging between Tk.275 to more than Tk.2,000 HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
NHA-2 also describes the major modes of NGO
8
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service delivery. Their services are distributed Most of the male clients visiting 
the health
as follows: 45% community-based public health centers were children. In the exit 
interview, 57%
service delivery, 41% outpatient services. of the clients were from urban areas 
(excluding
Inpatient services and training account for only the exit interviews conducted 
in NNP nutrition
3% and 11% respectively.' 7  centers). Of the clients interviewed, 64% were
married and 32% were never married, again
1.2.3. Equipment and Drug Availability indicating the emphasis 
the health centers place
on mothers' and children's health.
The 2004 NGO facility survey, carried out for
this study, found that about a third of all health Table 1.3 reports the 
type of service the
centers reported having all the basic equipments interviewed clients received 
on the day of the
and supplies. Another 60% had almost all the 2004 NGO facility survey. 
The most important
essential items listed in the questionnaire. type of service provided by 
the health centers, in
Almost all health centers reported having both rural and urban areas, 
was adult health
needles and syringes, functional sterilizer and services. In rural areas, adult 
health services are
fridge. About a third of the health centers relatively more important than 
in urban areas.
reported that they did not have vaccines in stock. Maternal care and women's 
health are the second
most important category of services delivered.
Table 1.2. Percent of NGO Health Centers Child health related services 
are not as important
Reporting Availability of Various Equipment, as expected in rural 
areas. Only about 16% of
Drugs and Supplies in the Center services are child health 
related; whereas in urban
Availabi Basic Vacci Oral Injectab areas it is about 
23% of the total. In both rural
lity equipme nes drugs le drugs
categorv nt and availa (out of (6) and urban areas, family 
planmng services
supplies ble 13) accounted for about 10% of all services 
used by
None 0 28.1 0 18.7 the clients in NGO health 
centers.
Less 9.4 9,4 0.0 15.6 Table 1.3. Distribution 
of NGO Services Received
than half Ion the Day of Interview 
as Reported by Clients
More 59.4 0.0 81.3 40.6 Type of service 
Rural health Urban health
centers centers
Have all 31.2 62.5 18.7 25.0 
No. % No. %
items I_I 
Family 37 10.6 50 10.7
Source: NGO Facility Survey 2004 (AUS Health planning
International with ADSL Bangladesh). Maternal care 91 26.0 
120 25.7
Women's 21 6.0 43 9.2
About 19% of health centers reported having health 21 6.0 
43 9.
all 13 basic drugs; 80% had almost all the drugs. Curative Child 43 
12.3 45
Among the health centers surveyed, only 25% Health
reported having all the injectable drugs, and 19% Preventive 14 4.0 65 
13.9
did not have any of the drugs listed in the survey child health
questionnaire (see Table 1.2). The availability of Other adult 141 40.3 139 
29.7
questonnare .. of health
various equipment, supplies, drugs and vaccines Accident 2 
0.6 5 I1
is positively associated with the facility size. The Others 
1 0.29 0 0
average availability score for drugs (percent of Total 350 100 467 
100
drugs in stock) increases with the number of Source: NGO Facility Survey 2004 (AUS 
Health
services delivered from the health center. International with ADSL 
Bangladesh).
In general, users' satisfaction is at a relatively
acceptable level; few users show a low level of
satisfaction with NGO services (Table 1.4) ,)8
Excluding the specialized health and nutrition
centers, the number of clients interviewed for the In rural health centers, about 
77% of patients
survey was 817, of which 77% were female. received a prescription, while 
in urban areas the
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proportion was about 81% (Table 1.5). The Most of the NGOs charge some fee for thepatients interviewed were also asked to rate the provision of services. In our sample of clientsquality of service received from the health center from rural areas, 30% said that they did not payon the day of the visit, and the results are very any money for the services they received. Inpositive. The exit interviews show that the NGO urban areas, the proportion receiving freefacilities tend to specialize in matemal and services was much lower, only about 18%.women's health and child illnesses, the priority Availability of drugs in the health center is often
services for NGO primary health care delivery considered an important factor affectingsystem. Most of the users reported that they were utilization of health centers. Fifty-four percent ofhappy with the types of services provided, and rural and 29% of urban clients reported obtainingthe services they received met their health care the drugs from the health centers they visited. Itneeds. appears that not all NGO health centers have
available the primary health care related drugs.
Table 1.4. Exit Interview Related to Service Quality in NGO Facilities
Service related quality Best Medium Low Lowestindicators Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Did you get all the services you 46.6 50.1 49.4 45.0 3.1 4.5 0.86 0.43expected? (%)
How satisfied are you with the 59.4 51.8 27.8 44.8 3.4 3.2 0.00 0.21service? (%) 
-
-How much of your needs were 39.0 60.0 52.9 32.1 8.3 7.7 0.00 0.21satisfied? (%) I I _ ISource: Exit interview with clients, 2004 (AUS Health International with ADSL Bangladesh).
Table 1.5. Provider Related Quality Measures as Reported by the Clients in NGO Facilities
Provider related questions Rural area health centers Urban area health centersProvider spent enough time (%) 93.1 97.0Provider asked questions (%) 95.7 93.4Physical checkup done (%) 76.3 51.4A prescription was given in writing (%) 77.1 81.5Will recommend the health center 96.8 96.2Source: NGO Facility Survey 2004 (AUS Health International with ADSL Bangladesh).
1.2.5. NGO Staffing growth potential within the organization was not
good enough, and 26% said that the futureThe total number of NGO staff is estimated at potential was very bad. Despite these problems,21,000, which includes both part-time and full- most personnel scored the quality of the healthtime staff.'9 Labor incentives still seem to be a facility very well, particularly in terms ofchallenge. According to the interviews with equipment quality, facility cleanliness, treatmentfacility personnel survey commissioned as part of quality received by patients, and punctuality ofthis study (see Annex 2),20 about half of the personnel. On a scale of 0 to 10, the averageNGOs' personnel reported unhappiness with their score for equipment quality was 8.0, andsalary and benefit levels, 40% questioned the cleanliness was 8.0. Most other aspects oflevel of workload, and surprisingly, only 26% of quality, e.g., treatment quality, punctuality ofthe staff interviewed said that their salaries are personnel etc., received a score of 9.0. Overallpaid regularly on time. Another problem the quality score does not vary significantlyaffecting labor performance is the limited among various NGO facilities.2 '
capacity of NGOs to offer their staff a sustainable
and attractive long-term career path. About a All personnel mentioned that they work aboutthird of all personnel interviewed said that the 8.0 hours a day, six days a week. Service
10
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providers in facilities operated by large NGOs For rural NGO health centers, the health care
reported working 70 hours per week, compared providers spend about 27 minutes traveling to the
to about 46 to 47 hours per week for health care facility. For large NGOs, more than 80% of
providers working for other NGOs. Senior staff providers live within five miles of the health
members of large NGOs also work longer hours. center but for other rural NGOs, about 57%
Despite the higher workload of personnel reported living within a five-mile radius.
working in facilities operated by large NGOs, the Seventy percent of service providers in large
expected monthly salary levels reported were NGO facilities reported that their families live
relatively lower for those personnel than other with them in the local area. Among service
types of NGOs. On average, the medical doctors providers in other NGO categories, 75% reported
earn Tk.13,500 per month and the medical living with their family in the local area.
assistants and paramedics about Tk.8,200 and
Tk.6,300 per month respectively. However, This study has not focused on how NGO and
salary is not the only source of income for NGO private sector staff are managed differently from
health center personnel; about 46% reported that those in the public sector, but it does provide
they receive additional payments from the NGO relevant data on salaries, and opinions of staff
for their work. Few NGO personnel reported from public and private providers in Annex 3.
receiving any tips or gifts from patients.
Table 1.6. Utilization of Curative Health Care Services by Provider Type
Type of facilities Household categories by quintile of Total
household per capita income
2 3 4 5
Poorest Richest
NGO (Codes 2,8) 1.7 25.0 28.3 16.7 28.3 100
Private clinic/ hospitals 14.5 17.0 19.0 22.2 27.4 100
(Codes 7,9)
Public clinic/ hospitals 18.3 16.6 20.2 25.2 19.6 100
(Codes 1,6) _ __ __
Other sources 23.7 22.5 22.0 19.8 12.0 100
(Codes 3,4,5,10,11)
Total 19.20 19.7 20.6 21.30 19.2 
100
Notes: Type of Facilities: I = Govt. Health Worker; 2 = NGO Health Worker; 3 = Homeopath; 4 = Ayurved/Kabiraji/Hekim; 5
= Other Traditional/Spiritual/Faith Healer; 6 = Govt. Doctor (Govt. Facility); 7 = Govt Doctor (Private Facility); 8 = Doctor
from NGO Facility; 9 = Doctor from NGO Facility; 10 = Salesman of Pharmacy/Dispensary; I I = Others.
Source: HIES 2000: Question 8 of Section 4 (Part A).
1.2.6. Equit and 2% respectively. A high proportion of
users of NGO healthcare services did not pay
Table 1.6 shows the utilization of curative for their drugs, compared to users of other
services in Bangladesh based on the results of providers' services. However, this exemption
the household income and expenditure survey is not fully in favor of the poor.
(national survey). Among the NGO service
users, about 30% were from the poorest two Among the NGO facility users, only 30% of
income quintiles. those who obtained free drugs belonged to the
poorest 40% group. This proportion was
Of those using NGO facilities for medical lowest among the private facility users (19%)
care, about a third obtained medicines from the and highest among users of "other" types of
facility itself, whereas users of thc public and medical care (59%). Average payments for
private hospitals and clinics obtained their those who paid for services were: Tk.416 for
medicines from the facility at a rate of 22% NGO, 'k.546 for private clinics, Tk.761 for
11
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public clinics and hospitals and Tk.370 for Considering the health centers that reported theothers sources, with the lowest variation targets and actual delivery, the averageamong users from public facilities.22  achievement rate is almost 100% or more for all
types of services.
1.2 7. Monitoring and Supervision
Table 1.7. NGO Performance: Average TargetAll the health centers reported to be open for six per Month, Actual Delivery in May 2000 anddays a week and about eight hours a day, but Target Achievement Rate in May 2004
vaccination services were available for only Types of Target/Month Actual Achievementthree days per week. One third of the centers services Month rate (%)provided child vaccination services every day.
On average, the health centers were supervised Child 391 347 88.7quite intensively (at least 16 times in six Immunization 
.Matemnal 520 396 76.2months). Most of the visits were from the Care 520_396_76.
contracting agencies. However most of the Family 783 599 76.5NGO health centers' personnel mentioned that Planning
the number of visits was inadequate for proper Curative 384 307 79.9functioning of the health centers. On average, Child Health
the NGO health centers achieved more than 75% AdusrIt Health 409 740 180.9
of their targets measured in terms of number of Source: NGO Facility Survey 2004 (AUS Healthvisits, while for adult health services, the target International with ADSL Bangladesh).
was exceeded by more than 80% (see Table 1.7).
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Chapter 2. NGO Contracting Evaluation in the HNP Sector in
Bangladesh
This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section reviews the lessons learnt from the
national NGO conitractintg experiences and assesses several NGO experiences in ten broad areas. In
the second section, four NGO modalities are assessed based on the findings of client exit interview
and NGO facility survey, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of those contracting models
employed in Bangladesh. These modalities are compared in terms of facility characteristics, staff
opinions, users' satisfaction and opinions, contract characteristics, and supervision and evaluation
capacity. The third section provides new evidence on the comparative advantages of NGOs and
public and private for profit providers. The results suggest that there could be potential benefits in
contracting-out specific health interventions.
2.1 Contracting Models in the HNP may however result in a reexamination of the
Sector of Bangladesh actual capacity level of the GOB.
2.1.1. The Options The fourth option recently has been
developed to resolve the contracting problem
A review of contracting models used in recent faced by the World Bank financed HIV/AIDS
years to involve NGOs in the delivery of the Prevention Project (HAPP). Over fifteen
Essential Services Package (ESP) in Bangladesh months after credit signing, there was very little
has resulted in a list of at least nine related project implementation. The Bank therefore
experiences. The first model is the basic requested the GOB to contract with UNICEF to
government procurement approach and related implement the project's NGO contracting
procedures and guidelines for implementation, component. With the assistance of PHD,
as defined by the GOB's Public Procurement UNICEF has screened over 554 expressions of
Regulations (2003). The MOHFW and other interest (EOIs) for short-listing purposes, and
ministries, including the MOF, follow these has identified 90 NGO organizations. Those
regulations when contracting with any entity to were reviewed at UNICEF's head office site
procure goods and services. Second, USAID has using a physical assessment (PA) tool. The
used contracting in many of its projects. USAID actual proposal assessment is currently ongoing,
has used contracting to provide assistance and contract negotiations were scheduled for
directly to the public, especially the poor, using completion in September/October 2004.
NGO service providers in the health sector and
in many other social and development sectors. A fifth option includes the ADB contracts
In the health sector, the consortium group NSDP used since 1998 to implement its Urban Primary
has implemented the contracting process. Third, Health Care Project (UPHCP). This model
the World Bank is supporting the GOB's represents some significant differences
National Nutrition Project (NNP). The MOHFW compared to other models currently in place.
is conducting the tendering process for this This project recently has been evaluated by RDP
project. The contracting process took some time Medi Vision International.
23  The ADB is
to be refined and necessitated additional planning to follow this project with a second
capacity building within the MOHFW. Recent project known as UPHCP-2. The design process
allegations of irregularities in the use of funds for that project is currently underway.
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Sixth, the Global Fund has contracted with contracted obligations. The most unique featurethe international NGO Save the Children USA of this set of guidelines is the incorporation of an(SCUSA) to work with the NGO Bangladesh assessment of the past performance criterion.
community to implement the large grant-funded
HIV project. SCUSA had expected to sign Finally, DFID has worked with NGOscontracts with NGOs by September 2004. through at least three modalities during theSeventh, BRAC has implemented many NGO HPSP period. These options were: (a) Partnersdelivered services by collaborating with DP as a for Health and Development (PHD) (formerly
"break bulk" operation, combined with a known as BPHC); (b) HLSP through themonitoring and evaluation function. In addition, SHAPLA project; and (c) NICARE through theas a partner with smaller NGOs, BRAC often implementation of the public private partnershiphas managed service delivery in health and other (PPP) project. They all used DFHD contractinghuman development (HD) sectors. guidelines for crafting the agreements with the
NGOs with whom they worked during theEighth, PKSF has performed a contracting implementation of the HPSP period, from 1998function in the micro-credit sector, and now to 2003. NICARE has obtained a no-contractbelieves it could perform a similar function in extension to further implement a unique NGOthe health and social sector fields. It arrangement with local community groups in theincreasingly has played the role of a financial delivery of the ESP.intermediary for DP in the micro-credit field,
especially since 2002 when it began This study identifies ten broad areas that areimplementing the poverty alleviation project essential for assessing the performance of NGOsupported by the IDA credit. PKSF follows contracts. Within these ten categories, forty-very strict guidelines when preparing a short list eight specific criteria have been identified. Theof NGOs with whom it plans to work. These ten areas of assessment include: (a) paymentcriteria include: (a) the basic characteristics of mechanisms, (b) fiduciary arrangements, (c)the NGO organization; (b) information regarding performance monitoring/accountability, (d)the organizer or founder of the NGO; (c) financial management reporting andcharacteristics regarding the management accountability requirements, (e) disputeprocesses and the Chief Executive Officer resolution procedures/processes, (f) management(CEO); (d) the personnel, including their of facility staff, (g) performance incentivetechnical and organizational skills; (e) the state specifics clearly articulated, (h) equity in accessof the physical plant and space (working area); to services and financial sustainability, (i)(f) the NGO's field activities to mobilize the measures of cost-effectiveness and efficiency,community's resources; (g) a review of past and (j) overhead and administrative costs andperformance regarding project/program provisions. To highlight the strengths andimplementation; (h) the maturity and strength of weaknesses of current contracting modelsthe management information system (MIS); and employed in Bangladesh, these ten categories(i) the capacity of the accounting system. Some were used. A summary of the assessment of theor all of these characteristics are employed by nine contracting options previously defined andone or more of the possible models to determine discussed is presented in Table 2.1.
whether an NGO would be able to perform its
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Table 2.1. Assessment of Various Contracting Models IJsed in the Bangladesh HNP Sector. 2004
l POTENTIAL CONTRACTING OPTIONS USED IN BANGLADESH 
l
Contract Assessment Criteria - 3. 6. GLOBAL
1. WB/NNP/M 5. FUND/ 9.
GOB/MOH OHFW/ 4. ADB/ Save The DFID/SHAP
FW/ 2. MOWCA/ WB/HAPP/ UPHCP/MO Children 7. 8. LA/
MOF USAID BRAC UNICEF LGRD&C USA PKSF BRAC NICARE
1. Payment Basis and Mechanisms Note 19 Note 17
1. Fee for Service System (FFS) no allows no No allows no NA no not stated
2. Prepay Capitation no no no No no no NA no no
3. Fixed Amount generally yes yes yes yes generally NA yes 
yes
4. Combination no yes no No no no NA no no
5. Bonuses Paid for Meeting
Performance Targets not generally yes no No yes ? NA 
no possible
generally
6. Payment Frequency per schedule. qtrly per schedule qtrly qtrly mthly/qtrly per schedule 
mthly qtrly
7. Payment Linked to Performance no/financial
Reporting? not generally reporting no No yes no NA can be 
yes
Fiduciary Arrangements and
11. Accountability
1. Board Functions & Responsibilities SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL Criteria
2. Meeting Frequency SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria 
SL Critenra
3. Representation SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL 
Criteria
4. Number of Members SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL Criteria in contract SL Criteria SL Criteria SL Criteria
5. Conflict of Interest yes yes yes No not stated yes no not stated not stated
6. Board Member "Compensation" no no no No via bonus ? no no unclear 
not stated
7. Provision for Reporting to not in
Stakeholders, Incl. Community no no no contract possible/qtrly no yes no 
no
-1I. Pefortnance Monitoing
GOB/MOHF NSDP/USAI GOB/MOHF PIO/ADB/M PKSF/DPs/G
I. Report to Whom W/N D W/NNP UNICEF OHFW SCF OB BRAC 
NICARE
12. What is Reported fin/per Note 14 Note 15 per/fin Developing per/fin fin/per 
fin/per
15
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Table 2.1. Assessment of Various Contracting Models UJsed in the Bangladesh HNP Sector. 2004
POTENTIAL CONTRACTING OPTIONS USED IN BANGLADESHContract Assessment Criteria 6. GLOBAL
1. WB/NNP/M 5. FUND/ 9.GOB/MOH OHFW/ 4. ADB/ Save The DFID/SHAFW/ 2. MOWCA/ WB/HAPP/ UPHCP/MO Children 7. 8. LA/MOF USAID BRAC UNICEF LGRD&C USA PKSF BRAC NICARE
fin sus (Note3. What is the Impact of Reporting not stated bonus/sanct not stated not clear bonus/sanct unclear 18) sanct pit stop
inancial Management, Reporting, and
V Accountability Requirements
generally
1. Frequency of Reporting qtrly mthly/qtrly qtrly qtrly qtrly mthly per contract mthly Qtrly
appendix per budget appendix per budget Reg. Fin. Reg. Fin. Reg. Fin. Reg. Fin. Fin. State2. Info Required schedules state state state state
yes yes yes not totally yes yes yes yes Yes13. Report to Whom Clearly Defined clear
4. Independent Auditors Conduct yes/yrly yes yes/yrly possibility yrly possible yrly possible yrly possible yrly possible possibleRegular Audits
5. Funds Securely Distributed to NGOs elect to Bank yes elect to Bank elect to Bank elect to Bank yes varies by check not stated6. Cash Management Procedures NA yes NA not discussed probably yes yes unclear not stated
.(Secure & Transparent)
7. Local Revenue Collection & Use is no yes NA NA no yes yes not stated not stated
-Managed Locally
8. Regular & Timely Financial yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes YesReporting to DPs Required
V. Dispute Resolution Procedures/Process
1. Use the Formal Legal System no no no no no no unclear unclear No
yes, w/in
2. Provision for Arbitration Process GOB not clear yes yes yes yes unclear unclear Yes3. Arbitration Process is Transparent &L Clear. yes NA yes yes yes yes unclear no Yes14. Provision Made for Resolution of unclear no unclear no Intent or Gr yes no no yes
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POTENTIAL CONTRACTING OPTIONS USED IN BANGLADESH
Contract Assessment Criteria 36. GLOBAL 
l
I. WB/NNP/M 5. FUND/ 9.
GOB/MOH OHFW/ 4. ADB/ Save The DFID/SHAP
FW/ 2. MOWCA/ WB/HAPP/ UPHCP/MO Children 7. 8. LA/
MOF USAID BRAC UNICEF LGRD&C USA PKSF BRAC NICARE
Professional Mistakes Neg
5. Provision Made for Professional NGO
Liability Insurance unclear no Required no indemnify yes no 
no Yes
6. Provision for Staff Dismissal &
Related Conflict Resolution not stated yes yes unclear yes generally unclear 
unclear No
VI Management of Facility Workers 
I
1. Does Management Directly Work at
the Service Facility not stated generally yes unlikely not stated yes not required unclear 
generally not stated
2. Does Management Conduct Training 
not
& Retraining of Staff not stated not stated yes not stated yes if agreed to unclear 
yes stated/yes
-3. Frequency of Worker payment not stated mthly unclear not stated not stated per budget unclear 
unclear not stated
4. Frequency of Worker Supervision not stated not stated unclear not stated not stated no unclear 
unclear not stated
5. Time Spent in Worker Supervision not stated not stated unclear not stated no no unclear 
unclear not stated
6. Use of Time Sheet not stated not stated unclear not stated not clear recommends unclear 
unclear not stated
Does Contract Spell Out the Specifics
Il. of Performance Incentives? no no no no 
yes no no/but allow
1. Incentive Criteria, I.e., Who gets
one?
* Corporate Performance Incentive yes yes
* Individual Performnance Incentive yes not stated 
._l
2. Criteria for Achieving Bonus Clear
in Contract/Annex no no no no yes no yes 
no No
deformed
3. Amt of Incentive NA 40 to 60% NA NA schedule NA unclear 
no not stated
4. Duration of Incentive NA yrly NA NA yes NA annual 
no not stated
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Table 2.1. Assessment of Various Contractine Models IJsed in the Bangladesh HNP Sector. 2004
POTENTIAL CONTRACTING OPTIONS USED IN BANGLADESHContract Assessment Criteria 6. GLOBAL i_3. 16. GLOBALI
1.WB/INNP/M 5. FU ND/ 9.GOB/MOH OHFW/ 4. ADB/ Save The DFID/SHAPFW/ 2. MOWCA/ WB/HAPP/ UPHCP/MO Children 7. 8. LA/MOF USAID BRAC UNICEF LGRD&C USA PKSF BRAC NICARE5. Other Incentives Used to Ensure LT
performance (tenure, pension, civil
service status) unclear not stated unclear unclear no not stated unclear unclear not stated
Methods to Improve Equity of Access
Vila Financial Sustainability
I. Is There a Complementary "Equity
Fund" Mechanism no no no no no no no no No2. Does the NGO operate a Health
Insurance Mechanism no no no no no no no no No
Measures of Cost-Effectiveness and
IX. Efficiency Note 13 11. Do Contracts Contain Such performanceIndicators? no no no yes indicators no derived no No2. Does NGO Mgt Get Evaluated w/
Use of Such Indicators no no no yes entire NGO no unclear no No
X. Organizational and Adm. Costs of Care
1. Overhead Rate no none shown no not pd no possibly no no No2. No of Non-Service Providing Staff no yes in budget can derive can derive can derive can derive can derive no can derive(Total Number and Share of Total
Workers) 
. .
Notes:
1. Appendix = defined in an appendix 5. Per = performance indicators specified in contract2. Fin = financial reports of expenditures and other financial matters 6. pmt= payment3. mthly = monthly 7. qtrly= quarterly4. NA = Not Applicable/Available 8. Reg. Fin. state = Regular Financial Statement
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9. sanct= sanction 11. Sus= sustainability
10. SL = short list 12. yrly = Yearly
13. UNICEF evaluates the management support costs closely and has several stipulations in their budget section for UNICEF 
project officers to monitor regarding their costs
and efficiency.
14. For the NNP, the report requiremenlts are defined in a special annex to the contract.
15. For UNICEF reporting, activitics and achievements need to be described. In the final report project outputs are required to be stated.
16. Performance reporting is not required to obtain additional funds, but a financial report is required before funds are 
disbursed.
17. The PKSF model of contracting is designed to provide small NGO entities with loanable funds to help create small scale 
enterprises, which are intended to become self
sustaining enterprises. The NGOs repay the loans to the foundation by collecting the repayments from the small enterprises 
they help to create. The small enterprises are
expected to provide a good or service that the local community is willing to pay for directly with out of pocket payments 
for services rendered.
18. Financial sustainability refers to financial sustainability that is reported.
19. Save the Children USA utilizes financial rules and guidelines developed in accordance with the US Government's OMB 
regulations
Sources:
I. GOB/MOHFW/MOF. Ministry of Planning, Tlhe Public Procurement Regulations, 2003, (Dhaka: Central Procurement Technical Unit, Implementation, 
Monitoring and
Evaluation Division, MOP, September 2003). Ministry of Planning, The Proceduresfor Implenientation of 1he Public P-ocuirement Regulations, 2003, 
(Dhaka: Central
Procurement Technical Unit, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Division. MOP, March 2004).
2. USAID, Tendering, bid, and contract documents for use in the USAID/MOHFW/NSDP, 2004 version of documents.
3. WB/NNP, Tendering, bid, and Contract documents for use in the WB/NNP/MOHFW, April 19, 2004.
4. WB/HAAPP/UNICEF, Tendering, bid, and contract documents for use in the WB/HAPP/UNICEF, July 2004.
5. ADB/UPHCP, Tendering, Bid, and contract documents for use in the ADB/MOLGRD/UPHCP, about 2000.
6. SCUSA/GFATM, Tendering, bid, and contract documents for use in Save the Children, USA and Global Fund Tendering 
and Contract documents, 2004.
7. PKSF, Annual Report, 2003, (Dhaka: PKSF, January 2004).
8. BRAC, BRAC/Non-Formal Primary Education Program (NFPE)/WB/MOEd, January 1, 2004.
9. DFID/NICARE, Nicare/BRAC Contract no. CNTR 98 5549, for the PPP Program, SHAPLA, Bangladesh, Funded 
by DFID, 1998.
19
NGO Contracting Evaluation for the HNP Sector in Bangladesh
2.1.2. Findingsfrom the Contract be enjoying full health. Rather, focusAssessment in Bangladesh indicators will need to be altered as new
health challenges arise. For example, some(i) PaymentBasisandMechanismns urban clinics are now beginning to monitor
type II diabetes, which is emerging as aA review of payment basis and mechanisms, health problem among their target
the first set of criteria for assessing populations. Thus, their currently defined
contracts, shows that it is uncommon for ESP now includes diabetes screening, withNGOs in Bangladesh to collect revenue for referral to appropriate secondary sources of
services rendered or use any other care for those afflicted with this growing
mechanism to obtain funds that would non-communicable health problem.
enable local rewards or sanctions to be
effectuated. NGOs contracting with (ii) Fiduciary Arrangements andNSDP/USAID and the UPHCP/ADB are the Accountabiliti
exceptions because they charge fees for
services to and utilize those fees as they In reviewing the second set of criteriadeem appropriate While currently there is regarding fiduciary arrangements andlittle linkage of payment to performance accountability, there is general agreement(except for the ADB urban health project), across all contract formats that the first four
the GOB could include this linkage in criteria, i.e., board functions and
contract documents. USAID links payments responsibility, meeting frequency,
to financial performance, but it could also representation and numbers of board
modify its documients to more directly link members, are commonly reviewed prior topayments to services or health status contracting, usually during the process of
outcome performance, if the various parties determining a qualified "short list."
could agree on performance indicators and
their monitoring. Other fiduciary indicators which are not
commonly incorporated into contractThe ADB contract links payment to the documents include: (a) whether board
achievement of specific performance members are paid for their service, (b) whatindicators. It utilizes baseline indicators board member's responsibility might be in
obtained by surveys of eaclh contracted area, situations of potential conflict of interest,
and bases its performance payments on the and (c) whether periodic performance
utilization of health services and the extent reporting is required to stake-holder and
to which the health status of the defined especially the community.
beneficiaries has increased relative to the
baseline. This method eliminates the The PKSF model does provide forproblem of some defined populations having community reporting because many of thepoor baseline indicators and others having community members have obtained loan
relatively higher indicators. The ADB bases funds from the community-based NGOs.its performance payments on relative Within the health field, however,improvement. That is, the health status of community reporting does not appear to be athe population is compared to their status at common requirement. Simple contract
the outset of the project intervention. language could stipulate that verifiable
evidence of NGOs' meeting withClearly, adjustments to the bonus criteria communities to report on their
will be necessary over time as current accomplishments and difficulties is requiredindicators are completely met for some for payments or reimbursements. ByNGO operated urban-based clinics. This including a community reportingdoes not imply that that the populations will requirement, current accepted practices
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would quickly change and accountability NGOs providing services contract with this
would increase. "middle man" to monitor and evaluate
performance as well as to conduct daily
(iii) Performzance Monitoring contract supervision for the NGOs. This
type of arrangement has the potential for
Third, to the extent that performance creating "conflicts of interest."
monitoring is done, typically performance is
reported to the contracting entity, which (iv) Financial Managenment, Reporting annd
then reports to the GOB and possibly to 4ccountabilitv Requiremients
other DP. Those entities that widely report
(excluding to communities) commonly do so Unlike the assessment of performance
via an annual report or an end of project monitoring, the required monitoring of
evaluation, or perhaps a power point expenditures and revenue is very clearly and
presentation held by the respective financier. concisely described within all of the models
Financial information regarding the use of reviewed. All require at least quarterly
financial resources is required by the donor financial statements (and some require
community, and this type of information is monthly statements). All have language in
also required by the GOB for financial their contracts to allow for the possibility of
accountability reasons. annual or even more frequent external
audits, although most models do not
However, most of the contracts reviewed implement external audits frequently
also stipulate a set of performance measures, because of the expense. All options require
which must be periodically reported. The that financial statements be prepared and
main difference between the contracts is the sent to the contracting entity, which in turn
extent to which performance outcome and reports to the funding DP.
financial payments are linked. Only in the
ADB urban PHC project and those With one exception, all contracts have
established by NICARE (on behalf of DFID) clear provisions regarding the disbursement
is this linkage clearly defined. Currently, as of funds to the NGO contractor. Most
a result there is little impact for non- conmmonly, funds are disbursed by electronic
pertormance because there are no financial transfer into designated bank accounts, or
mechanisms in the agreements to focus via some other defined approach to ensure
NGO managers on project outcomes. These the secure transmission of funds to the
"cultural management norms" need to be implementing NGO.
chaniged. The language of most contracts
can be modified easily to redefine these If revenue from out of pocket payments
norms. is envisioned, as is the case in the ADB
Urban PHC Project, there are clear
It is worthy noting that the ADB's procedures defined in the contract or related
UPHCP has paid significant attention to annexes as to how such funds are to be
performance. In fact, an external private accounted for and how they will be held.
consortium was established to conduct But formal fee retention at a local facility
regular performance monitoring and represents a potentially illegal procedure
periodic survey evaluations of health according to the laws of Bangladesh.
2 4
outcomes. Other contracting mechanisms
do not include this additional "check and (v) Dispute Resolution Proceduries/
balance" among the NGOs involved in Processes
implementation or the DP financing the
endeavor. The other models reviewed rely Virtually no dispute envisioned within the
on a "middle man" contracting entity. The context of the current contracting procedures
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relies on the formal legal system for country. Addressing malpractice will
resolution. In fact, most if not all models facilitate improvements in the quality ofhave established internial procedures for maternal and child health care delivery,
resolving disputes througlh formal mediation which underlies the high maternal and infant
with the organizationi involved in the mortality rates found in Bangladesh today.
contracting process. Provisions also have
been made to resolve disputes through In many European countries, professional
various arbitration entities established malpractice instances are resolved through alocally or internationally. In those cases "no-fault" process of arbitration managed by
where the dispute resolution process is the professional societies involved in
unclear, revisions to their contracts should licensure, and with oversight from thebe made prior to the launch of the upcoming MOH. These procedures could be fruitfullyHNPSP. reviewed in any effort to improve the quality
of health care delivered in BangladeshBoth NICARE/DFID and Save the through the next sector program.Children USA/Global Fund have clear
procedures for addressing instances of The problem of professional liability wasprofessional malpractice. These and the partially addressed during theADB project are the only exemplars that implementation of the HPSP, through the
required some form of insurance coverage DFID funded SHAPLA "Strengthening offor such possible occurrences. However, it Nursing Project (SNP)." Nevertheless, thereis unclear where the contracted NGOs are many additional professional groups and
obtained such coverage. Currently, generic issues related to the quality of healthBangladesh has no legal basis for holding care service provision that warrant
medical professionals liable for any systematic monitoring and review.
negligent behavior or services rendered.
Until parliament passes an act dealing with Finally, while most contracting models
medical profession liability, the fomal legal have provisions for dispute resolution in
system has no clear jurisdiction in this area general, few if any specifically address how
except for possible legal sanctions.2- to resolve NGO personnel disputes
regarding working conditions, pay disputes,The arbitration procedures stipulated in gender equality and/or relationship issues, or
most contracts are not established to address other matters. Grounds for personnelprofessional malpractice potentialities. dismissal is included in some contractThere are procedures within Bangladesh to models, for example, NSDP, NNP/WB andbring malpractice matters to the attention of ADB, but many have no provisions for suchprofessional authorities through the various potential disputes. The NSDP contract hasprofessional medical societies, such as the some language addressing the grounds forBangladesh Medical Association. However, dismissal, but it is an area where furtherthere is no instance to date where such improvement could be made.
appeals have led to any disciplinary action
against licensed medical practitioners, let (vi) Management ofFacility WVorkers
alone against those who do not have any
such qualifications. Because the ESP will With respect to provisions regardingby necessity become increasingly complex personnel management, beyond dispute
as the patterns of disease change, it will resolution, few common themes emergebecome increasingly important to address from this review. Some models requirethe lack of professional malpractice. This NGO management staff to be on site, but
will be an important step in improving the others do not have such a requirement. Aquality of health care delivered in this different subset indicates that personnel
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training will be performed as a part of the provided within the contract budgets. The
management function. This provision is ADB has worked out an elaborate procedure
common in the NGO contracting context of for determining the size of financial bonuses
Cambodia as a vehicle to improve the for NGOs, which can provide verifiable
quality of care. evidence of health status gains in defined
populations.
The amount of payment due to the NGO
by the contracting entity is clearly delineated Further, the recently conducted mid-term
in the contract. There is no language about evaluation of the UPHCP demonstrated
the frequency and amount individual staff clear health outcome improvements in those
will be paid for their work. Typically the clinics which received bonuses. The award
budget indicates the amount that individuals of a bonus is directly tied to health outcome
will be paid, and financial statements show indicator improvement.
7
the actual amount paid to individual
personnel over the reporting period. But the Other documentation about the
reporting indicates that there is great distribution of bonuses to specific
variation in the amount that is actually paid individuals within an NGO may exist.
to individual workers during each However this brief review did not delve into
accounting period. Further, there is little such detail. It would be useful to learn more
transparency about the disbursement of about how bonuses are distributed within
funds provided to individuals for fringe USAID and ADB supported NGOs to
benefits or bonuses. ascertain whether the distribution has any
relationship to actual service provision by
Time sheets are not commonly required, specific health care providers.
though one model proposed by Save the
Children (USA) recommends their use. (viii) Methods to Improve Equit y ofAccess
Other provisions regarding the process and and Financial Sustainabilitv
the time involved in personnel supervision
are generally not stipulated, though they None of the contract models evaluated
may be used as an internal control included provisions for improving the equity
mechanism. Most areas reviewed suggest of service provision by incorporating an
personnel management is not yet an equity fund or a voucher scheme in the
important part of contracts issued by DP, nor contract.
is it an issue that the GOB has any great
interest in, as it is not included in its most None of the NGOs were requested to
recent revision of guidelines for public implement some form of health insurance
procurement.26  Thus, personnel scheme to enhance the financing of the
management is not included as a formal part improved service delivery system that
of NGO contracts. Since it is not formally resulted from the contracting of facility
included in the set of issues reviewed in the management to NGOs. During the next
process of short-listing NGOs, it may be HNP sector program, experimental, pilot
presumed that it is not yet an area of concern contracts can be initiated by including some
that may disrupt project implementation. form of equity fund and community-based
health insurance scheme to address supply-
(vii) Performnance IncentiNes side management issues of service delivery,
financial access for the poor, and financial
Three of the eight contract models reviewed sustainability concerns.
have provisions for some form of incentives.
The NSDP has provisions for fairly
generous bonuses and fringe benefits
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(ix) Measures of Cost-Effectiveness anzd 2.2 Performance Evaluation ofE,ficiencv Selected NGO Contracting Models in
Among the contract formats reviewed, there Bangladesh
was little focus on cost effectiveness or 2.2.1. The Selected NGO Contracting
efficienlcy concerns. However, some Models to be Evaluated
contractors did indicate interest in
addressing these issues. For example, NGO contracting modalities wereUNICEF is monitoring management support classified into the following models:
costs and would insist that efficiencies are
realized regarding these cost elements.
ADB also has indicators in its monitoring Model 1: Direct contracting andprogram that include total cost of service management by the Government ofdelivery in relationship to service outputs. Bangladesh or a government entity(UPHCP and NNP); Model 2: A
The possibility of incorporating contracted manager to manage the
efficiency measures into the calculation of contracting arrangements with the NGOsperformance bonuses could be an additional and organize monitoring and evaluation
element of designing an experimental activities (NSDP and BPHC); Model 3: Anprogram to find ways to realize efficiency autonomous trust for developmental andgainsr and at the same time improve the social service activities including healthgains, andicator th samertime dimprove t(Dhaka Ahsania Mission and Grameenoutput indicators of service delivery. Lallyan); and Model 4: NGOs receive
(x) Organizationial and Administrative Costs direct funding from donors, usually under
of Care a contracting arrangement (BRAC, DSK,Gona Shaysthaya Kendra); A Model 5: A
Overhead rates and indicators of not-for-profit registered company
administrative cost, such as the ratio of organized or selected for managing the
service providers to administrative staff, are provision of other developmenital activities
not included as issues that require the (PKS and SDF) is also compared with the
specific attention of NGO health facilities previous models in section 2.2.5.
managers. The contracts reviewed do not Each NGO model has its own
contain any provision regarding such costs Each Nd modvantas the
or the impact of these costs on the total cost advantages and disadvantages. The
of service provision, purpose of this section is to review thebasic characteristics of these models and to
However, in the budget sections of evaluate them on the basis of the findingsseveral contract documents there is of the exit and facility surveys carried outinformation about the numbers of for the purpose of this study (see Annex 2).
administrative staff and how much they are
paid. Various calculations based on this 2.2.2. Comparison of the Models Bvasedinformation could be made to obtain bench on the Facility Survey
mark indicators about these cost elements.
Since the administrative cost of service Table 2.2 shows the ranking of the fourprovision could be a large share of the total types of contracting models. In terms of
cost of service provision, it is vital to initiate supervisory visits, direct contracting
a systematic effort to document this cost models received the highest number ofelement.28  visits during the last six months, while theindependenlt trusts had the lowest number
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of visits. The direct contracting model contracts. Direct contracting with large
receives supervisory visits from different NGOs appears to be the worst model in
entities. For example, the UPHCP terms of facility-based characteristics
facilities receive supervisory visits from important for achieving the social
the NGO under which the facility is objectives desired by NGO contracting.
organized, from the monitoring agency The contracted manager model involved
contracted by the project, as well as from the hiring of many small NGOs, and it did
city corporation officials who are not rank well in specific facility-level
responsible for overall management of the characteristics.
Table 2.2. Ranking of NGO Models by Facility Characteristics Based on Facility Survey Data
(1=best, 4=worst)
Facility based indicators Direct contract Contracted Independent trust Large NGO
manager
Supervisory visits 1 3 4 2
Size of facility 3 1 2 4
Percent exempt: immunization 2 4 1 3
Percent exempt: normal 1 3 4 2
delivery
Maximum charge of 2 3 1 4
immunization
Hours per unit of service 2 3 1 4
TOTAL l 17 13 19
Source: NGO Facility Survey 2004 (AUS Health International with ADSL Bangladesh).
Assumptions: Better situations are defined as higher supervisory visits, larger size, higher exemptions, lower
maximum charge and lower hours per unit of service.
2.2.3. Comparison of the Models Based condition for the provision of quality
on NGO Personnel Survey services from the NGO facilities.
NGO personnel were asked if they were With regards to the above criteria, the
satisfied working in their organization, independent trust model ranks at the top
whether they see future growth potential followed by bilateral contracts with large
with the entity, etc. (Table 2.3). NGOs. Direct contracting and contracted
Personnel satisfaction is an important manager models fall relatively behind the
others in ranking.
Table 2.3. Ranking of NGO Models by NGO Facility Personnel Opinion (1=best, 4=worst)
Facility personnel Direct contract Contracted manager Independent trust Large NGO
opinion
Happy with the job 1 3 4 2
Future growth potential 4 2 1 3
Happy with salary/benefits 2 3 4
Workload at acceptable 2 4 3 1
level
Receive salary regularly 4 3 1 2
Residence within 5 miles 2 4 1 3
Time spent traveling to 4 2 1 3
work
Personal opinion on 1 3 2 4
quality
Total 20 24 17 19
Source: NGO Facility Personnel Survey, 2004 (AUS Health International with ADSL Bangladesh)
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2.2.4. Comparison of the Models Based large NGOs. Direct contracting was ranked
on Exit Interviews with Facility Clients the best in terms of time spent by providers
with patients. Aggregating all the ranking
Table 2.4 reports the ranking of the NGO values assigned by the clients to different
facilities from the users' point of view. In aspects of service quality, the direct
terms of waiting time for obtaining services contracting model ranked first with an
in the facilities, the large NGOs were aggregate score of 16. Independent trusts
ranked at the top, i.e., the users of those are ranked second in terms of overall
facilities reported the lowest amount of satisfaction by the clients using their
waiting time on average compared to the services. The contracted manager model
facilities of other types of NGO models. and large NGOs with direct contracting
However, the clients reported a higher from the donors performed relatively
degree of unhappiness with the amount of poorly.
time providers spent with patients in the
Table 2.4. Ranking of NGO Models Based on Exit Interviews with Clients of NGO Facilities(1=best, 4=worst)
Client opinion based Direct contract Contracted Independent Large NGOindicator (exit survey) manager trust
Waiting time in facility 2 3 4
Provider spent enough time 1 3 2 4
Provider asked 1 4 2 3
questions/health 
-
Physical checkup was done 2 4 3 1
Rating of quality of service I 2 4 3
Received all services 3 2 1 4
expected
Will recommend this center 3 2 1 4
Received a prescription today 3 4 1 2
Total 16 24 18 22
Source: Exit interview with clients of NGO facilities, 2004 (AUS Health International with ADSL Bangladesh).
2.2.5. Qualitative Survey and Comparison identified from the findings of the exit and
of the Models facility survey carried out for this study, a
ranking exercise was done. The survey
The information obtained from the survey included interviews in 53 health centers of
of the NGO partners was used to assess the the 16 selected NGOs. Information was
performance of NGO contracting gathered from 173 facility personnel and
experiences in Bangladesh on the different 1,224 users. The results of this ranking
aspects of contracting. Based on the exercise are shown in Table 2.5.
models' advantages and disadvantages as
Table 2.5. Performance Evaluation of Selected NGO Contracting Models in Bangladesh
Parameters The co tracting ex]periences
BINPINNP BPHC NSDP SDF PKSF UPHC
TOTAL SCORE (mean) 2.6 3.8 2.9 3.0 3.6 2.7
Bidding Experience and Selection
Process:
Announcement (publishing, putting on 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
website, etc.)
Bidding fairness 1.7 4.0 2.7 4.0 4.0 3.7
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Table 2.5. Performance Evaluation of Selected NGO Contracting Models in Bangladesh
Parameters The contracting experiences
BINP/NNP BPHC NSDP SDF PKSF UPHCP
Clarity and completeness of bidding 4.0 4.0 3.3 2.0 4.0 3.3
document
Timeliness in terms of concluding 3.0 4.0 3.7 2.0 4.0 0.7
review, signing contract, etc.
Contract duration 0.3 3.0 1.7 3.0 2.0 2.0
TOTAL SCORE (mean) 1.35 4.0 2.5 1.5 2.0 0.38
Flexibility of Contracts:
Autonomy or flexibility for decision 1.7 4.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 0.75
making -
Price changing rules (budgetary 1.0 4.0 3.3 1.0 2.0 0.0
reallocation, changing line items, etc.)
TOTAL SCORE (mean) 1.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.13
Supervision and Regular
Monitoring:
Supervision quality 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 1.0
Provision for rewards for good work 0.7 3.0 1.7 2.0 0.0 0.7
Provision for punishment for non- 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 1.7
performance
TOTAL SCORE (mean) 2.23 3.0 3.1 1.7 2.0 2.9
Maintenance of Service Quality,
Training and other Partnership
Supports: -
Scope for maintaining service 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.25
standard and assuring quality
Training (HRD) 2.0 3.0 3.3 1.0 3.0 2.75
Other partnership support 2.0 3.0 2.7 1.0 0.0 2.75
TOTAL SCORE MIS, benefit 2.3 3.0 2.7 3.0 4.0 1.75
monitoring and evaluation I
Keys: 0=Negative (unappreciable situation), I=Reasonable, 2-Positive, 3=Highly Positive, 4=Excellent
Source: Survey of NGO managers and partners 2004 (AUS Health Intemational with ADSL Bangladesh).
2.3. Comparative Advantages of Public focus on NGOs and their performance relative to
Providers, NGO and Private-for-Profit the public and private-for-profit providers.
Providers in Health Care Services in
Bangladesh Multidimensional View of Performance
The public sector cannot afford the "luxury" of The dimensions of performance covered in this
high cost, ineffective service or inefficient section are quality (technical and perceived),
provision. An alternative view holds that private price, accessibility, cost, and value (value
providers are often not superior to the public integrates the other dimensions of performance
sector in terms of quality or efficiency, and that into a single concept). The primary source of
contracting is a complex undertaking, especially information is a survey with a sample of 50
in countries with limited institutional capacities facilities, including public, private and NGO
(Harding and Preker, 2003; Liu, 2004). To facilities at the upazila level, and public and
"make or buy" health services is the question private facilities at the district and national
that must be asked when considering ways to levels. The next analysis refers to the
improve the performance of health systems. performance comparison at the upazila level
This section presents a brief summary of the (Annex 3 describes the survey methodology).
29
empirical evidence on these issues with a special
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A first analysis of the results considered an considered by the analysis: upazila level public
aggregated measure of each of the dimensions of and private facilities, district level public andperformance. For the first six dimensions--- private facilities, national level public andperceived quality, technical quality, price, private facilities, and NGO facilities. Perceived
accessibility, cost and perceived value---a quality, the first dimension, is the average score
relative score for each dimension was between the quality perceived by the trained
constructed based on a set of indicators captured enumerators and the patients. The results showfrom the facility questionnaires, exit polls and that perceived quality is consistently best in thedirect observations. This score ranged from 0 to private sector, at all levels. NGO facilities also100. The worst observation received 0 and the obtained higher scores, which are superior tobest received 100. The derived value, the final that of private facilities at the same leveldimension of performance, is a ratio between (upazila). Perceived quality as seen from thequality and price/cost, and may have scores in facility questionnaire (performed by trained
values over 100. interviewers) and from the exit polls (applied to
patients) also shows the same tendency (seeFigure 2.1 shows the performance dimension Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3).
scores obtained for the seven domains
Figure 2.1. Aggregated Performance Dimension Scores
100
75
50
Upazila Distnct iNationalN
source: Facility Survey, Exit Poll Outpatients, Exit Poll Inpatients and Direct Observation surveys of Public andPrivate Providers, 2004.
Technical quality, the second dimension, is show the best scores in technical quality. Athe average score between the technical quality separate analysis of technical quality shows
measured through the facility questionnaire, exit mixed tendencies. The scores obtained from thepolls and direct observations. The results show facility questionnaire, which considers aspectsthat technical quality increases with the facility such as the availability of informnation systems,level. There is also a tendency for private protocols, stock of drugs and supplies, training,facilities to show a slightly better score than and policies for female patients, show thatpublic facilities. However, NGO facilities, in public facilities are more or less homogenous at
spite of being similar to the upazila level the different levels, with a technical qualityfacilities in termns of size and services offered, score ranging from 40 to 60.
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The public facility scores differ from the score of public facilities increases with the
results obtained in the private sector, where facility level. The private facilities show a
technical quality scores increase with the facility similar tendency, although private facilities at
level, from a low of 10 at the upazila level to a the national level present an abnormally low
high of 77 at the national level. NGO facilities score. However, the NGO facilities obtained the
show a score of 73, almost as high as the private most notable results, outperforming all the rest.
facilities at the national level. The scores The scores obtained from direct observations
obtained from the exit polls, which determined if (see Figure 2.4) show a clear tendency of the
the patient was explained the diagnosis, received private facilities to perform better in the higher
instructions on the drugs prescribed, knew the levels. Except at the district level, the public
amount to pay before receiving the service, and facilities show relatively low scores. The score
was shown a price list, show that both public obtained by NGO facilities is relatively higher
and private facilities are heterogeneous. The than other upazila level facilities.
Figure 2.2. Facility Questionnaire Performance Dimension Scores
q0.
75O
50 e rei qual i
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U) Accessiblt
25 _
Public Pri~ete Public Priete Public pnsete
Upazila Distrct National NGO
Source: Facility Survey of Public and Private Providers, 2004.
Price, the third dimension, is the average always near 100, meaning they charge (if they
score between the price information collected in do) the lowest fees. Private facility scores
the facility questionnaire and the out-of-pocket decrease with the level of the facility, meaning
expenses of patients interviewed in the exit that higher level facilities charge higher fees and
polls. The results show that both out-of-pocket signify larger out-of-pocket expenses than lower
expenses and fees charged by the facility are level facilities. NGO facilities also obtain a
consistently lower in the public sector than in relatively high price score, almost reaching the
the private sector. Public facility scores are level of public facilities.
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Figure 2.3. Exit Poll Performance Dimension Scores
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Source: Exit pol of outpatients and exit poll for inpatients of public and private providers, 20042
Figure 24 Direct Observation Performance Dimension Scores
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Accessibility, the fourth dimension, is the tendencies. On one hand, accessibility
average between indicators measured in the indicators measured with the facilityfacility questionnaire and in the exit polls. The questionnaire (Figure 2.2) show that at higher
viewpoint on accessibility from the facilities' levels there is higher accessibility, except for
side and the patients' side has opposing upazila private facilities that report good
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accessibility. NGOs have the lowest scores. On of district level private facilities, and the highest
the other hand, accessibility from the patient's is that of NGO facilities.
standpoint (Figure 2.3) is higher at the lower
levels. NGOs have the highest accessibility Derived value, the seventh dimension,
score. combines quality with price or cost. There are
three alternative measures of derived value. The
Cost, the fifth dimension, is the average of first shows the relationship between the quality
the cost scores obtained from the direct score, the average between technical and
observation of the six selected services (Figure perceived, and the price score, as measured by
2.4). At the upazila level facilities---public, trained enumerators in the facility questionnaire
private and NGO---similar cost scores are noted. (see Figure 2.5). The figure shows that private
facilities lie on a straight line starting at a high
Perceived value, the sixth dimension, is quality and a high price for the national level
measured from the patients' standpoint. Figure and ending at a low quality and a moderate price
2.3 shows that the lowest perceived value is that for upazila level.
Figure 2.5. Value Derived from the Facility Questionnaire
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high price Highestvalue
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Source: Facility Survey of Public and Private Providers, 2004.
The district level lies between the national The second alternative for deriving value
and upazila levels. This means that even though comes from the exit polls. The quality score is
quality and price vary considerably between the average between the perceived and technical
different level private facilities, their value ratio quality scores. The price score is obtained from
(quality/price) is more or less constant. In the out-of-pocket payments made by the
regards to public facilities, they all lie close to patients. Private, public and NGO facilities all
each other in the figure, in an area of low price occupy distinct zones in the graph (Figure 2.6).
and moderate quality. Public facilities have Private facilities lie in a zone of moderate to
quality scores similar to those of private upazila good quality at a moderate to high price. Public
and district level facilities, but at a much lower facilities lie in a zone of very low price and
price. NGO facilities, however, have a price moderate to low quality. NGO facilities lie in a
score almost as good as public facilities, but zone of high quality at a low price. This means
enjoy a much better quality. that NGOs show the highest value of all, while
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the value of private versus public providers is a moderate to low quality at a low cost. This
more difficult to evaluate unambiguously as they means that the value ratio of these facilities islie in such different zones. more or less constant, even if they span a wide
range of qualities and costs. It may be observedThe third alternative for deriving value comes that district level public facilities lie close tofrom direct observations. In this case, the national level private facilities, and that upazila
relationship between quality (exclusively level public facilities lie close to upazila leveltechnical) and unit cost is used (see Figure 2.7). private facilities. Finally, district privateThe figure shows that all facilities, except the facilities unambiguously show a higher valuedistrict level private ones, lie approximately on a than other facilities. They have lower costs than
straight line starting from district level public all other facilities and are only surpassed by thefacilities, with high quality at a moderate cost, quality of district public and national level
and ending at national level public facilities with private facilities.
Figure 2.6. Value Derived from the Exit Polls
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Source: Exit poll of outpatients and exit poll for inpatients of public and private providers, 2004.
Figure 2.7. Value Derived from Direct Observations
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Source: Direct observation survey of public and private providers, 2004.
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Chapter 3. Diversification of Service Provision in the HNP
Sector: Policy Options
Tlhis chapter contains the proposal aind policy' strategies for the diversification of service
provision in the HNP sector. These strategies were f6rinulated keeping in mind the lessons learnt
-lescribed in Chapter 2, andt considering the feiasibility of contracting modalities within the
current social andl political context of Bangladesh. This chapter will describe the options
available to organiize the contrcacting-olut process anid will outline the proposed policv strategy
and( the legail atnd( instituitional arrangements reqluired to launch the large-scale diversification of
service provision in the Bangladesh HNP sector.
3.1. Options to Organize the particular model below in Annex 4 (Figure
Procurement and Monitoring Process IV.I).
The Strategic Investment Plan (SIP) 2003- (i) The MSA Approach
2010 foresees a major shift in the MOHFW
role from providing services to becoming a The MSA approach provides for an
steward of services. The MOHFW is agreement between a particular DP (or
committed to scaling-up the diversification of conceivably more than one DP) and the
service provision through the contracting of GOB, via the MOHFW. The flow of funds
NGOs, and private sector and other non- goes from the DP to the MSA, which after
public providers for the delivery of ESD working out the required tendering
services. Under the HNPSP support, this procedures will work with the NGO
contracting process will be implemented with community directly, signing contracts and
pool-eannarked funds (Category 2 funds of moving the service delivery process forward.
IDA credit anid grants from co-financiers). Policy guidelines would flow from the
MOHFW to the MSA. The DP would
A numiiber of contracting models have conclude an agreement with the MOHFW
been reviewed for their feasibility within the acting on the guidance of the GOB, and its
context of Bangladesh. There were four local office in the form of some type of
models outlined in the DFID financed contractual agreement, perhaps in the fonn of
"Scoping study."30 These options included an MOU.
(a) direct GOB managemenit, (b) not-for-
profit registered company,(c) contracted A minor flow of funds may go to the
maniager or the managemenit service agency MOHFW for some specific policy work to be
(MSA), and (d) an autonomous pursued over the life of the agreement.
trust/foundationi. The report assessed each of Otherwise, cash flows from the DP to the
these modalities in light of their flexibility MSA. Information flows from the MSA to
and feasibility of imiplementation within the the DP and the MOHFW. NGOs send
Bangladesh context and concluded that the periodic reports to the MSA (see Annex 4,
MSA optioIn should be considered the most Figure IV.I).
flexible and the most easily implemented by
the GOB and its DPs. Examples of this The MOHFW, with input from the NGO
approach include the NSDP, BPFIC, Affairs Bureau (NAB) at the Office of the
NICARE, and possibly the SCFUSA/Global Prime Minister, would define the minimum
Fund arrangement. See a schematic of this requirements for the NGOs to be eligible to
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participate in the bidding for contracts contribute to the long run development of the
through the MSA. country.
This MSA contracting mechanism has However, the MOfiFW's record of poor
been established for a number of bilateral governance and contract management and the
DPs for a long time, especially with regards need to deliver services in the short term
to USAID, which has been operating in this makes this option very attractive.
manner for more than two decades. There Additionally, it may be very difficult to
are at least six international entities currently obtain agreement from the government to
operating in Bangladesh, which have played out-source this institutional capacity for
the MSA role within the health and achieving long-term sustained health sector
population sector,31 and they all have the benefits. Under extraordinary circumstances,
experience and technical expertise to perform MSA agreements were conceivable and were
these contracting tasks. In addition, several obtained in the case of the WB HIV/AIDS
of the large local NGOs also have played this project (HAPP). Even in that case, it was
role in one or more projects,32 including in agreed to out-source the contracting
health and education. Therefore, this is an procedure to UNICEF, a partner UN
option where both the GOB and DPs have organization.
experience.
(ii) The Direct Maniagemienit Apptroach
All the MSAs discussed above have had
the additional responsibility for providing TA The World Bank has tried to employ the
services to community-based NGOs so that GOB direct management approach in several
the package of care is developed according to of its most recent lending operations,
the criteria determined by the MOHFW and including the Nutrition and HIV/AIDS
the DPs in the project documents. The projects. It established a project
MSAs have been involved in setting up the implementation or management unit within
supervision and performance monitoring the MOHFW structure, and has tried to
procedures, and have implemented them. contract via such entities to implement the
Thus, their annual reports and midterm and proposed work programs. However, the
final evaluations provided the evidence of MOHFW has been able to implemenit the
achieved outcomes. The MOHFW National Nutrition Program (NNP) only after
periodically receive debriefings from the considerable effort and long delays, and the
MSA, but the MOHFW has generally not NGO contracts are still not fully
been involved in directly monitoring the implemenited.
MSAs' performance. The DPs have been
much more involved in the oversight of their In the case of the HIV/AIDS Project
"own" MSA(s). (HAPP), implementation lagged for about
three years without any significant fund
It is argued that the main disadvantage of disbursement. The MOHFW project unit
this modality is that it does not yield any issued an expression of interest (EOI), but it
public sector capacity building benefits, did not have the capacity to respond to the
especially to the GOB. The sustainability of more than 550 EOI applications it received.
this option is also often questioned. This Thus, after over a year of considering various
concern is especially important if the options, and several missions recommending
project/program and the institutions created different courses of action, the MOHFW and
are necessary to maintain long-term World Bank agreed to ask UNICEF to
sustainability. The MSA option does not develop a tendering process to respond to the
contribute to the government's capacity of or large numbers of EOls, develop a "short list",
develop an organization that over time will
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and ask those on the list to submit proposals performance-based incentive and bonus
for project implementation. scheme. Specific NGOs can obtain sizeable
bonuses equivalent to up to 6% of the total
Under this option, cash flows from DPs to contract amount. The management of this
the MOHFW and reports flow in the opposite mechanism, along with the performance
direction. Money and policies flow from the monitoring of contract outputs, has been
MOFIFW to PMU. PMU reports to the contracted out to a consortium of private
MOHFW. Money flows to NGOs or other entities, including a private international
implementing agencies, and infomation university and a local research and evaluation
regarding perfonnance flows back to the firm. The PMU within Dhaka City Council
PMU (see Figure IV.2 in Annex 4). only serves as a middleman in this process.
Figure IV.3 in Annex 4 illustrates the
Since November 2003, when UNICEF organization of this approach.
and the GOB signed an agreement for the
implemenitation of a HAPP component, Whether the UPHCP experience can be
known as the HAIF, the short list was created replicated by the MOHFW remains the DP's
with the help of a private firm, proposals primary concern generally, and the WB's
were reviewed, and contract negotiations concern particularly, due to allegations of
have been initiated with the selected groups. poor governance within the city council of
Actual NGO project implementation started Dhaka where the PNfU of the UPHCP is
about nine months after UNICEF got currently located. It remains unclear how
involved. This timeline is "reasonable" for well this model may work over time.
Bank supported projects in Bangladesh.
What other options are available? The
(iii) ThleModifiedDirect Managemenit "scoping study" suggests two options: the
Approach trust or foundation model, or the private not-
for-profit registered company model (the
The ADB has implemented the Urban PKSF organization is the most notable
Primary Health Care Project (UPHCP) exemplar of this option). The foundation
through the Ministry of Local Government, model in Bangladesh is exemplified by the
Rural Development and Cooperatives Freedom Foundation, which uses a private
(MOLGRD&C). It appears that its bilateral endowment to support the ideals of freedom
collaborating partners, i.e., the Nordic from poverty, ignorance and oppression.
Development Fund (NDF) and UNFPA, are
relatively content with the progress made to (iv) Bangladesh NGO Foundation Option33
date. The PMU resides in the offices of the
Dhaka City Council. This project took over a The GOB recently has proposed the creation
year to begin its NGO contracting process to of a Bangladesh NGO Foundation to support
provide services and manage urban-based and expand NGO activities in different social
PHC facilities. Now however, it is areas. The proposal includes the formation of
considered a "model of success." In the the foundation executive board accountable
review of its contract documents, this project to a general council. The general council will
was evaluated as "highly innovative in the formulate the foundation's rules and
Bangladesh context because of participation regulations, elect members of the executive
by NGO providers and the local government board when applicable, approve annual
and for its implementation of an incentive budgets and audit reports among other
system to improve performance. functions. This body will have a chairman
and fifteen other members appointed by the
One of this project's most noteworthy GOB. In addition, any NGO can become a
achievements is its development of a member of the foundation provided that it is
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has been registered for the last three years the foundation's investment. In the initial
and pays a defined contribution. phase, the DPs would be responsible for a
sizeable share, but not all of the PMA'sThe foundation's primary mission would financing. The GOB would allocate the
be to provide periodic grant support to NGOs remainder of funds. A schematic diagram of
who have the capacity to deliver social how this modified NGO Foundation could
services, including health care, to the poorest operate is shown in Figure IV.5 in Annex 4.
and most disenfranchised people in the
country. The foundation's mandate is not 3.2. The Proposed Contracting-out
explicit as to whether any positive outcome Strategy
or performance indicators would or should be
monitored. These design issues appear to 3.2.1. What is "Successful Contracting?"
have been overlooked as well as the possible
conflict of interest if an NGO is both a It is essential to determine what criteria
member of the general council and an should be used to detemiine contracting
applicant for foundation funds. It appears to "success" at the facility or local level.
be a modality, which in its current design Success should be measured in terms of the
could become an important vehicle for following criteria:
political patronage without proper checks and
balances incorporated into the GOB rules and . Whether there are sustainable institutional
guidelines. As currently conceived, the NGO mechanisms in place throughout the
foundation is not a sustainable option since it country to assure PHC services, asis does seem to be a mechanism that could be defined by the ESP, and whether these
transparent or accountable enough to DPs or services are available and delivered to the
local communities to warrant sufficient most disadvantaged groups in the
support. population
The existence of a transparent biddingHowever, it might be possible to modify process
certain aspects and create an innovative new . The application of performance-based
approach including the elements that follow. financing
* The implementation of accredited qualityFirst, the members of the general council services
cannot be a majority drawn from the GOB. . Fiduciary accountability
Second, the board's chairperson would be Financing sustainability
elected by the board members. Third, the Strong community and local govemment
members of the board would be remunerated participation
and would not all serve the same tenm
lengths. . Fourth, the foundation's executive To ensure longer-term success, it will bedirector would not need to have a formal seat vital to define "success" as developing
on the board, but would sit "ex-officio," i.e., locally managed institutions that can ensure
without a formal vote. Fifth, unlike the the long-tenm delivery of healthcare services,
PKSF model, the foundation initially would which are financially viable entities asbenefit by being required to engage an proposed in the future strategy outlined
intemational auditing firm for financial below. The objective is to promote the
management purposes, and also an transfonmation of the NGOs from social
independent performance monitoring agency entities that deliver social services to(PMA). Together, they would review dynamic social entrepreneurs that achieve
monthly records of service by awardees, and social targets with the maximum efficiency.
also conduct periodic surveys to ascertain the Therefore, for monitoring and evaluation
achievement of outcome goals financed by purposes, important "success" indicators of
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the NGO contracting initiative are funds for diversification of service provision
organizational and financial dynamism of the by the NGO/private sector is feasible. These
service delivery entities. The MOHFW- funds will represent about US$25 million per
operated government service delivery system year, which is 20% in additional resources
has not been able to assure this type of over the average annual expenditure incurred
success. For long-term success, performance by NGOs on HNP activities (estimated at
agreements should be considered to ensure US$125 million).3 4
sustainable financing support.
This section provides some options on
A main concem is the extent to which how to implement the above described
NGOs can be contracted to deliver services. alternatives for service delivery. Since the
The accumulated knowledge and experience government is searching for sustainable
attained by several NGO networks in the approaches to commission NGOs to deliver
country (as described in Chapter 2) provide a HINP services, the suggested policy options
good potential base to scale up the presented here include both the "what" and
diversification of service provision through the "how" for expanding the diversification
NGOs and also in partnership with private- of service provision to help in future
for-profit providers. The proposal to increase agreements between GOB and DPs.
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Figure 3.1. Proposed Contracting Arrangements
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3.2.2. The Public aid Private Partnership own management/support unit to coordinate
Proposalfor the Diversification of Service and lead the service delivery for a group of
Provision during HNPSP providers (NGOs or private providers
running health facilities).
All DPs and the GOB openly acknowledge
that more flexible engagement is required The strategy for purchasing services from
witlh clients in their reforms, particularly since NGOs will require definition of the following
all recognize that change is iterative and items:
incremental. The WB will need to take steps
to align the next ITNP operation to deliver on The key elements of the contract: size
this strategy. The objective is to have a single and specifications of the contract
MOHFW-contractor interface. The packages to be purchased, what services
contracting agency would have full will be covered, length of contracts, and
admniistration and budgetary control, whether they will be bid partly on the
receiving funds directly from the MOHFW. basis of prices or whether they will be
This new arrangement implies an adaptation fixed price contracts. The contracts
of the contractinig-out process to a new legal must allow the experimentation of
setting and institutional arrangement as several models of service provision to
described below. ensure a reasonable size. The latter is
essential to ensure financial economies
(i) Malnalgemiient SulpportAgen7cyfor of scale, improved supervision and
Diversification of Service Provision contract management, and decreased
monitoring and evaluation costs;
'I'he MOHFW has some experience * The criteria for choosing the
contracting services, and it is likely to obtain geographical areas of interventions.
agreemenit of the GOB to utilize this One possibility would be to start in the
approach to extend service delivery. There unions where there are already NGOs
have been a few attempts to contract for delivering HNP services and to focus in
services via the MOHFW, with generally the underserved poor areas;
poor results, e.g.. the World Bank's National The procedures to monitor and
Nutrition Project (NNP), and the HIV/AIDS supervise the performance of the
Prevention Project (HAPP). Despite NGOs/private sector networks;
problems in institutionalizing transparent The establishment of the contract
contracting procedures in the Bangladesh agreements and well defined bidding
social sectors, the tendering procedures process (such as letter of invitation,
appear to be quite transparent, and have not instructions to bidders, evaluation
resulted in any significant disputes with criteria, involving professional experts
interested NGOs. In addition, the MOEIFW in the selection process, etc.);
is interested in piloting NGO contracting for * The payment mechanisms to providers.
the delivery of ESP, and is engaged in The MSA can also experiment with a
conversations with other interested parties." 5  combiniationi of options;
Bonus incentives to providers and
The proposed MSA would manage the wlhether to give the contracted providers
funds allocated for commissioning the possibility of retaining user fees.
NGOs/private sector providers during the
HNPSP support, including the management The MSA, a private institution, is
of the pool funds. The MSA would contract proposed to lead the process of contracting,
packages of services from NGO/private assisted by other accreditation and
networks. The networks could contain their supervision agencies. The NGOs' audits will
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be carried out by private sector auditors hired approach) to supervise NGOs providing HNP
by the MSA. The MSA would be services.
responsible for the following:
Other key institutional conditions that
* The implementation of MOHFW's need to be developed for further contracting
decision of what services to contract out are the following:
* The decision of from whom to purchase
services (ii) Accreditation
* The definition of the contract payment
option Some elements of the NGOs' accreditation
* To negotiate the terms of the contract are de facto being done and updated in
with the selected provider(s) Bangladesh already, but with different
* To supervise and to monitor the standards. The following entities/projects
performance of the contracted have undergone pre-screening exercises to
provider(s) contract NGOs in order to implement WB
* To modify contracts based on and other DP projects and programs in the
perfornunce social and other sectors: PKSF, BRAC,
* To promote the formation of public and UNICEF, UPHCP, NNP, BPHC and NSDP.
private health networks at the union This pre-screening function also occurs in the
level NAB, a Bureau located at the Prime
Minister's Office. In the late 1980s and earlyThe performance of the MSA and its 1 990s, the DPs requested that the GOB
contractors would be evaluated by a third develop a NGO registration system to
party every year. This assessment activity facilitate the short-listing process. Since
would be financed by the DP and would 1990, the NAB has registered NGOs for a
provide the justification for whetlher an five-year period, which may be extended by
altermative option needs to be considered in reregistering for another five years. The
the future. The altemnative option refers to a registration process also helped the GOB and
non-profit registered companly (such as the DPs learn more about the NGOs financial
PKSF Model), which commissions backing from official DPs, and from many
NGO/private sector networks for HNP other international groups involved in
service delivery (see Figure 4.4). Great humanitarian and development assistance
emphasis would have to be placed on the around the world.36
initial assessment of the prospective NGO
partners' and private sector's capacity, and If an NGO is not registered with the
for designinlg and sustaining new NAB, it is not eligible to obtain financial
organizations and legal settings. In addition, support from externally financed projects or
efforts to build local capacity of community programs. The NAB, along with the other
boards to strengtheni social control and groups identified above, have extensive
accountability will have to be promoted. screening criteria that they use to determine
which NGOs are qualified to contract withThe MSA would have a board and would DPs to implement development activities.
work as a semi-state agency with formal
management procedures. It would lead the Despite the fact that the NAB conducts its
process for contractinig out HNP services to assessments of the NGO's viability, there are
NGO networks, and in the future to otlher delays in conducting assessments and
non-public providers. This agency could also issuance of the registration document
encourage contracts with NGO networks that required to obtain international support.
promote the formation of Community-Based Officially, the maximum time period
Organizationis (CBOs) (PPP/NICARE required for registration is 45 days, but it
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may take twice as long. The review function The National Accreditation Agency for
for the health sector could be housed in the HFNP (NAAH) would work with consumers,
NAB, but it could also be reconfigured and the MOHFW, health care purchasers, NGO
set up as an independent review body which networks, legislators and the providers to
could accredit NGOs instead of formally develop standards for public and private
registering them. providers in Bangladesh. Participation in
accreditation and certification programs
To perform this function, NAB's role will would be voluntary during the first five
need to change from a government years, and would then become mandatory for
supervisory body to an entity that is fully all NGOs or non-public providers applying
acknowledged by all involved parties as for funds from the NGO trust fund
having a transparent, simple and prompt management body. This would create
process to certify that a NGO is a legitimate incentives for good providers and incentives
entity, has a performance track record of for long-term investments, distinguishing
actual service delivery, and complies with them from providers who offer poor quality
quality standards defined by the agency. services.
The accreditation agency, wherever The NAAH should evaluate health care in
located, will develop a national data base on three different ways:
the performance of all potential contracting
entities, and certify that each NGO is a legal * Through accreditation (a rigorous on-site
entity with a home base that meets basic assessment of key clinical and
minimum operating standards. Such an administrative processes)
agency could also monitor the quality of * Through provider health plan data if they
service provision and the organizational exist
capacities to deliver a minimum quality of * Through comprehensive users' and
service. providers' surveys
African countries, such as Zambia and Regulation is usually costly. Therefore,
South Africa, have institutionalized accreditation should ensure a minimal set of
accreditation bodies in the health sector. standards on health service provision. To
Asian countries, including China, Thailand, improve NGO services, non-regulatory
Korea, and Japan, also have such bodies. interventions or incentives would also be
There are a number of examples of health essential, such as bonuses to personnel and
sector regulation in Europe, including those providers for achieving health targets,
from the former Soviet block, e.g., Lithuania, increases in contract length, and capitation
the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Czech due to good performance, etc.
Republic.
The NAAH would use a number of
However, the literature appears mixed factors to establish rankings of health
regarding the effectiveness of regulatory facilities (or NGO networks) measuring five
bodies in improving quality and cost- core areas: (a) clinical services, (b) client
effectiveness performance.37 Most regulatory satisfaction, (c) infection prevention, (d)
bodies have had a positive impact on management system, and (e) facilities and
improving process indicators of service supplies. Indicators for these core areas could
delivery, especially in large hospitals and include the following:
among the medical profession, but their
impact on cost and outcomes awaits further
investigation.
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a. Clinical Services easy for the pubic to understand, e.g.,
.
Number of doctors and specialists in excellent, good, satisfactory, below average,* Nuber f dctor andspelahss m and oor
relation to the number of patients P
* The adequacy of resources--human The NAAH could use two modalities for(health personnel), equipment, and health accrediting health care providers:
facility infrastructure
* The existing health care services in the
healt faclitya. The NAAH would conduct inspectionshealth facilIty directly,
* Access to training by health workers and b Cont'th
practitioners in the health facility private institutionsp
* Availability of drugs and diagnostic
testing facilitiesQuai faictios The inspection team prepares the
accreditation report and makes* Whether doctors are licensed and trained recommendations to the NAAH.
to practice medicine
* Whether the users are satisfied with the (iii) Performance Monitoring Agency (PMA)
services received
* How facility managers deal with poor An independent/autonomous unit, known as
practices and complaints against their "Performance Monitoring Agency (PMA),"
practitioners or health workers would be created. This agency's existence is
* The level of cleanliness in the health justified because the GOB is required to
facility monitor the quality and performance of the
* The access to water, electricity and other contracts prepared and managed by the MSA
services in the health facility to guarantee value for money, accountability
* The quality of the food provided by the and proper checks and balance of thehealth facility
Thealtio oprcioesam sttv contracting process. The MOHFW would
workerstin th healtiityi provide overall policy guidelines for this
workers n te helthfaciityagency. The PMA would be given the* The existence or absence of clear and aec. TePAwudb ie hr mandate to supervise, monitor and evaluate
written standards and protocols for the performance of each contractor (and sub-treatment and diagnosis
* The average waiting time of a patient contractor if applicable), and to provideinformation to the management contractingbefore he/she receives treatment
* Fatality rates from surgery of various body,aNto nworksu an thF EAchcontractor would submit to the PMA twotypes reports at the end of each quarter: (1)
* The extent to which patients recover Performance Report and (2) Financial
effectively from illness Report. Both these reports would follow a
b. Users' Satisfaction pre-defined standard format.
Indicators to measure user satisfaction would Based on the quarterly performance
include the users reported level of comfort, evaluation reports (performance evaluation
promptness of service, treatment by the index), the MSA would compare the
doctors and health workers, privacy, performance of each contractor against pre-
availability of services and food received. defined performance criteria. A yearly
evaluation could be commissioned to an
To be eligible for accreditation, a health external party. This could be a renowned
facility/provider would need to be in research and survey firm (preferably
operation for a minimum of two years. The international). The evaluation would be
ranking of providers should be simple and given to the MSA and should impact upon
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the following year's budget allocation for the * Proportion of women with obstetric
contractors. complications treated at facilities
* Discontinuation rate of contraception
Perfonrance would be measured using * Proportion of women who receive
four categories and the following weights: antenatal care
* Proportion of women who receive post-
" Production of services (20%) natal care
* Organization (20%) * Proportion of poor users who utilize
• Management (20%) services
* Quality and outcomes (40%) * Payments made by poor users at the
health facility
For each component a goal would be sethelhfcitFo,ahcmoeta ol udb e * Proportion of poor users who are exempt
and points assigned accordingly. The fromur fees
maximum score could be 100, and bonuses fromuserfees
re f * Proportion of poor users who receive free
would be allocated for a score of 75 points, medicines at the health facility
including incremental bonus increases above
that score. The scoring would be made by * Proportion of users who report a
extemnal consultants hired by PMA. satisfactory level of service* TB case detection rate and cure rate
These indicators will be measured using * Vitamin A coverage
independent studies based on user-exit polls, Management Indicators:
household surveys, sample registration of * Number of complaints related to
vital events and other available techniques. procurement
Some indicators suggested for setting * Number of audit objections in each NGO
performance targets and assessing progress network
are described below. * Unit cost of ESD
Outcome Indicators: At the beginning of the contracting
* Infant Mortality Rate reductions in the process, the NGO short-listing criteria can be
target populations, with a significant constructed on the basis of information
decrease in rich/ poor and male/female obtained from independent performance
ratios. evaluations conducted on the NGO's
* Under-5 Mortality Rate reductions in the previous work. These evaluation documents
target populations, with a significant need to be verified with international partners
decrease in rich/poor and male/female providing the financial support. The key to
ratios. successful NGO/private sector provider
* Matemal Mortality Ratio (or suitable proxy) performance include: concrete mechanisms
reductions, with a significant decrease in to improve service quality, performance
rich/poor ratio. monitoring linked to incentive scheme,
* Fertility rate reductions in the target continuous on-the-job staff training, referral
populations. guidelines, and basic diagnostic methods for
The last four indicators might be the most common health problems in the
measured every two years to capture the specific geographic area of the facility.
trend of the indicators. (iv) HNP Observatory
Output indicators:
Percentage of children fully immunized The HNP observatory function can be
against the six diseases within the first commissioned to a private agency located in
year of life Bangladesh and financed by grants fromDPs. The main activities of the Health
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Observatory can be grouped into the a. Retention of User Fees
following categories: Another legal issue of concern has been user
fee retention at the local health facilities.
. AAccording to the Republic of BangladeshHelp to educate, assist and protect Constitution, article 84 states that any fundsindividual's rights through consumer raised or collected for services rendered mustinformation, consumer participation, be submitted as revenue to the government's
consumer advocacy programs, data collection general consolidated fund. This
and independent quality oversight. Draft interpretation has not enabled any
model policies or legislation on specific areas government entity to hold funds collected
of interest. Help consumers to know about from patients/clients for the purpose of
options for coverage, provision and operating the facilities. Whether this
treatment. interpretation will remain a barrier to any
expanded utilization of user charges by NGOb. Form Coalitions contractors is a potential issue for scaling-up
c n by the use of NGOs/private providers inBroaden coaltions by creating delivering the ESP.
worker/consumer partnerships at the local
and national level. Implement a quality This issue may be mitigated by a
watch-line (toll free number), which would geln rue m ay ownership ofcolec csesofpor qaltyof care from government ruling regarding ownership ofcollect cases of poor quality ofthe health facilities through which theconsumers or health workers in the country. proposed service package will be delivered.These would be real life stories, which would Froexample ifcthe ESP is delveredibeueu o h esg fpocnue For example, if the ESP is delivered Inbe useful for the design of pro-consumer community clinics which are built on land
contributed by the local community and with
the community's involvement in the facility'sThe coalition will work at the community construction, it may be possible to argue thatlevel in coordination with the local health atce8 osntapy seilywe hwac.rus opie of m be swt article 84 does not apply, especially when the
.creiii, legitimac an leaders hiph ESP staff are seconded or NGO employeeslocal who are not current GOB staff.potential, for example, local advocates,
teachers and business men/women. In addition, the ADB supported UPHCP
.in Qualit Measurement health facilities apparently have been
. acharging user fees for the past several yearsEnsure that the consumer's voice is included with the full knowledge of thein all forums and working groups related to MOLGRD&C. This "exception" needs to belegislation or decisions regarding the HNP investigated to understand why and how
sector. these facilities have been granted an
exemption from this constitutional
d. Accountabilit4i requirement.
The Health Observatory should be There also may be ways to legally retainindependent of providers and those financing fees at the point of collection, as there ishealth care, and free from conflicts of ambiguity in the current interpretation of theinterest. word "revenue" in article 84. If the fee
collections are not considered "revenue," but
rather as cost recovery or otherwise,
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then the constitutional requirement may be a for preventive services. Without the ability
moot issue. Certainily if NGO contracting is to raise user fees, the NGOs will experience
envisioned for hospital level services, there difficulty raising a substantial part of their
may be a need to directly address ways to operating budget.
revise the current understanding of article 84
and related implementation, to allow It is suggested that providers contracted
facilities the ability to charge user fees and under the proposed contracting arrangements
retain a proportion of the fees at the facility be allowed to charge user fees. They would
level. be required to display their price list in front
of the health facility. This percentage may
Since, the utilization of user fees as a increase subject to satisfactory achievement
means of financing contracts can create of the key social targets. The provider would
equity concems, proper targeting mechanism retain the user fees to provide financial
should be in place to identify the poor and incentives.
exempt them from paying such fees. To
identify the poor, a proxy mean test formula b. PaY)ment Mechanism
and community participation combined needs
to be applied by all NGO modalities under Contracting payment mechanisms may refer
contract. These NGO/private sector to block grants, capitation rates, case based
networks may also implement other targeting and fee-for-service, labor and material
mechanismiis. The government's role here is payments, cost and volume, and set price.
to ensure that there is a strict exemption Each of these options has positive and
policy in place and that it is being negative aspects. The contractor may choose
implemented. to use one specific option, or a combination
for different service packages.
One possible mechanism is the provision
of a healtlh card to each beneficiary. The It is proposed that each provider receives
health cards may be color coded. For an initial payment or fixed amount for a
example, a patient with a red health card specified volume of services. Excess volume
would be charged a different scale of user may be paid on a fee-per-case basis, with a
fees than a patient carrying a green health maximum number of visits that canl be billed
card. Red, for example, could indicate a poor for during a specified period. The
patient, and hence exempt them from user contracting agency would develop a cost-
fees. While green could indicate a slightly based provider financing system and will
higher socio-economic status, thus signaling reimburse providers each quarter with agreed
facilities to charge user fees to those patients prices and contract ceilings.
with green health cards. Strong community
involvement is recommended to identify poor At the end of each quarter, a certain
households and individuals. Until further percentage would be allocated for each
refined, targeting mechanisms can be provider/facility as a 'perfor7iance bonus.'
employed based on the several That extra (bonus) amount would be given to
criterialmethodologies adopted by the current the facilities if they meet the pre-specified
NGO modalities. performance targets. For instance, 60% of
these extra funds would be translated into
The charging of user fees may be seen as bonuses for the facility's staff and distributed
a strategy of 'cross-subsidization.' That is among the staff according to pre-specified
those patients who can afford to pay proportions. The remaining 40% would be
subsidize the services for those who cannot. channeled into a basket known as the
Furthermore, the fee received from curative 'Facilitv Maintenance Fund,' which would
care services may be used to subsidize the fee be used by the health facility's management
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for day-to-day facility maintenance, e.g., have to reach the target of a specifichiring private security guards or cleaners, proportion of poor patients exempt from user
laundry, maintenance of electrical appliances, fees to qualify for remaining in the
equipments, and other utilities, etc. fee/revenue-sharing scheme.
On the other hand, if the facilities fail to d. Procurenment of Government Drugs and
meet their targets, they would not get this Medical Supplies
extra fund to give to their staff as bonuses Another legal issue to consider is whether
and to put into the Facility Maintenance government-owned health facilities managed
Fund. These funds would instead be re- by NGOs/private provider organizations
channeled to those facilities that performed must only use GOB supplied pharmaceuticals
well and met the targets. This bonus system and related supplies from the Central Medical
would act as an incentive to encourage good Stores Department (CMSD). Can contracted
or adequate performances by the facilities NGOs/private provider organizations procure
c. Incentive Schemne pharmaceuticals and medical supplies from
any other vendor available, at possibly aCharging user fees could also be tied to an lower price'?
incentive scheme, such as a fee-sharing
schemle with the physicians/clinical doctors. In the context of Cambodia, NGOs
The physicians can be paid a certain pre- continued to receive pharmaceutical items fordetermined share of the revenues their local clinics through the public mechanism
services generated through user fees. This such as the CMSD, and they procured locally
would serve as an extra bonus to their regular only when it was "medically necessary."
salary. For example, if a doctor saw a This approach appears to be a pragmatic
specific number of patients in a month and solution to a potentially complex problem.
helped to generate Tk.100 in user fees, the
revenue from those services would be The GOB has issued its new procurement
divided perhaps 40/60 between the physician guidelines recently. However, the
and the facility respectively. An additional procurement process will remain far fromincentive could be introduced for physicians transparent until there is strict enforcement of
who work on weekends and/or in remote the existing rules and regulations. The DPs
rural areas. They could be offered a higher and the GOB have yet to agree upon test
percentage of the revenues generated by user piloting a third party agent to procure goods.
fees. In this case, perhaps revenues would be
divided 60/40 between the physician and the It is proposed that a separate fixed fund,facility respectively. Under this scheme a the 'Drugs & Clinical Supplies Fund,' to be
no-tolerance rule for illegal payments to used to buy drugs and supplies would be
utilize public health services would apply. given to the contractors on a yearly basis as
part of each contract. As was done in the
This fee-sharing scheme could lead to Urban PHC project, the contractor (i.e. the
'cream skimming' that is treating patients NGOs) could be given the responsibility of
who are capable of paying (i.e., the more user purchasing the drugs and supplies, with somefees generated, higher the amount of revenue exceptions such as vaccines, contraceptives
sharing), and bypassing the poor patients and micro-nutrients, etc. The NGOs would
who are exempt from user fees. One procure these drugs from pre-qualified
mechanism to counter-act this undesirable suppliers identified by the MSA and agreed
outcome is that the contract terms will upon by the MOHFW. Where applicable, theindicate that the NGO/private sector contractor would follow either theproviders and thereby the physicians would government procurement regulations or the
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lead donor procurement regulations, e. Staffing
whichever is deemed more feasible. With
regards to contraceptives, vaccines and NGOs/private provider organizations would
micro-nutrients, the procurement would be have autonomy regarding the delivery of
done through government's own logistic HNP services, but only in accordance with
system. the government's health policy andguidelines. They would also be bound by the
An Essential Drug List, comprised of contract to achieve certain health targets.
drugs considered to be the most effective and The NGOs/private sector providers could
reasonably priced, could be drawn up by the have complete authority over hiring, firing
MSA in coordination with the government and paying staff.
and the DPs. The contractor would be
ultimately responsible for ensuring that all The contractor would sign individual
drugs on that list are available at the contracts with the health facility staff. The
facilities. Availability of drugs and supplies public health facility staff could in turn be
on the Essential Drug List could be included contracted by the NGOs/private sector
as one of the contractor's performance targets organizations. The staff would be paid more
that must be met. than their government salary out of the yearlyfixed contract funds. In order to be
The establishment of a drug pricing contracted by the NGO/private sector
committee could be considered to ensure the organizations, the GOB staff would have to
best purchase price, quality of drugs and take leave from their government jobs to
some standardization throughout the country. work for the contractor. However, the GOB
will need to provide adequate legal
Patients would have to pay a certain arrangements to allow those contracted staff
amount of fees to obtain essential drugs from to continue the same career path as they
the provider (with the exception of vaccines, would have had in their government jobs.
contraceptives, micronutrients, etc.). The Those staff would get additional incentives,
fees for those drugs would be subsidized so such as the fee-sharing scheme and the
that they are less than the price at the drug performance bonus scheme as outlined
store/pharmacy. This would encourage above.
patients to purchase the drugs from the
contracted providers rather than paying the
full price at the drug store. At the same time One potential innovative model involving
it would allow providers/contractors to community participation is the NICARE
generate a certain amount of revenue, which approach which was implemented during the
would be used for procuring more drugs and HPSP period through the DFID funded
supplies. SHAPLA project. It has had some initial
success in developing a community based
An exemption policy would apply here as organization, which was facilitated by partner
well. Patients carrying red health cards (i.e. NGOs that provided locally based TA. This
the poor patients) would be exempt from option sought to determine the extent to
paying fees for drugs and would receive free which the community organizations could
drugs and supplies from those providers. become self-sustaining in providing a quality
End of year evaluation would show whether package of services and ensuring equity of
the demands of poor patients for drugs and access to the ESP.
supplies have been adequately met by the
providers. Meeting those demands could be In this model, the NGOs are facilitators in
made one of the performance targets. mobilizing community support to implement
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quality ESP through the almost 11,000 in applying for MSA funds under the defined
abandoned community clinics (CC) that exist competitive bidding conditions.
throughout the country. The NGOs also
work with locally based private clinicians to 3.2.3. Building the NGO Service Deliveryfacilitate collaboration with well-established System: Plan ofAction
private care providers. This model had not
yet been scaled up into a large pilot The design and implementation of the future
endeavor.38 Thus, it would be useful if the results framework for commissioning NGOsMSA widely promoted this approach as an and private sector providers to deliver good
additional contracting modality. quality primary and secondary health care
services require DP assistance to buildIn order to improve local accountability, suitable managerial skills and institutional
each CC would adopt a functional arrangements. The MOHFW will develop theCommunity Group (CG) consisting of civil legal and institutional arrangements for this
representatives elected by the community. purpose. Selected technical assistance shouldThe CG will manage the CC. The MOHFW be provided through DP grants and the
may directly promote and coordinate this pooled trust fund managed by the WB.process and assist this kind of NGO network
A preliminary action plan and timeline are suggested in the chart below, conditional upon an
agreement with the GOB.
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Chapter 4. Main Messages and Policy Options
This chapter contains information from different sections of the stidy, and suggests policy options
to assist the Government of Bangladesh in scaling up the government's role in purchasing HNP
services from the NGOs and the private sector.
4.1. Key Findings show potentialities of contracting which,
if properly considered and guided, could
I. The GOB has considered contracting as result in higher returns to the public
one of the alternative strategies to budget. Clearly, contracting should be
diversify health care service provision to implemented when society will reap the
increase the consumption of quality benefits. The evaluation recommends the
services by the poor and to increase the establishment of a contracting-out system,
likelihood of achieving the MDGs. The which will have a number of attractive
new approach of contracting out services features that can enhance transparency
implies a greater focus on outputs and and improve performance. The results
results, increased autonomy permitting will provide positive outcomes in the
providers to respond quickly to new medium as well as long term.
scenarios, and more flexible working
arrangements and incentives for staff and 4. Over the last few years, NGO service
providers to achieve social targets. It delivery activities funded by both direct
demands non-public providers to be DP financial support and public sources
responsible for achieving social targets, to have increased substantially. About 769
work with transparency and NGOs are working in the HNP sector, and
accountability, and to promote a new role the number is increasing steadily. NGOs
of stewardship for the government, incurred an average annual expenditure
emphasizing increased capacity to on HINP activities of US$125 million,
perfonn the functions of a purchaser of which is approximately 8.4% of total
services, rather than trying to micro- health expenditures. DPs are the major
manage the provider's business. financiers of these activities, contributing
73% of the total NGO funds. NGOs have
2. There are a number of areas where also developed a significant labor force;
improvements might be achieved, mostly they employ about 21,000 people. NGOs
in the components of supervision and have started to develop mechanisms to
evaluation, and in fonmulating the target the poor and to charge user fees.
incentive structure for rewarding good Their capacity to target the poor has been
provider and NGO staff performance. thus far assessed to be better than the
Nevertheless, there will be difficulties in public health facilities' capacity.
implementing interventions aimed at
enhancing efficiency, financial 5. A number of NGOs charge user fees.
sustainability and management oversight. There is evidence that NGOs are more
effective in exempting poor people from
3. Contracting is not the only solution to user fee payments in the rural areas than
increase coverage, improve quality of the government health facilities. The
services and provide greater access to the NGOs still face difficulties in targeting
poor. Nonetheless, evaluation findings poor users in the urban areas, however.
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The level of user satisfaction and Autonomy and flexibility of decision-
availability of drugs in the NGO facilities making is crucial in the management ofis more acceptable compared to the public NGO providers. BPHC and NSDP had the
sector. NGOs also have built mechanisms highest performance in this regard. NGO
to monitor and supervise the performance partners from both these networks are
of their contracts. allowed up to 15% of budgetary
reallocation/changes with acceptable6. A group of selected NGO contracting justifications. These networks also
experiences were identified and 'a present strong quality of supervision,
comparative analysis was undertaken. support from the contracting agencies,Model 1: Direct contracting and and effective systems of reward and
management by the Govemment of punishment.
Bangladesh or a governmental entity;
Model 2: A contracted manager to The partners of BPHC, NSDP, SDF,
administer the contracting arrangements PKSF and UPHCP all held positive
with the NGOs and organize monitoring impressions of their emphasis on quality
and evaluation activities; Model 3: An assurance. The government-managed
autonomous trust for developmental and contracting model BINP/NNP received
social service activities including health; the lowest score in this aspect. In
and Model 4: NGOs receiving direct addition, NSDP and PKSF have the mostfunding from donors, usually under a comprehensive MIS and database
contracting arrangement. These models decision-making capability, includingpresent advantages and disadvantages to various performance-based programs andbe considered in case of potential future results-focused trend analyses. BPHC
support to the contracting process. and SDF reported relatively high scores
for MIS and monitoring and evaluation.7. Findings show that supervision under However, NGO networks generallydirect contracting with large NGOs is not process data manually, which contributes
extensive. The satisfaction of personnel to poor quality of data transmission andis an important condition for workers to analysis.
provide quality services. Worker
satisfaction was the highest in the 8. There are good prospects for contracting-independent trust model, followed by the out certain services at certain levels. Atbilateral contracts with large NGOs the upazila level, NGO facilities yield the
model. While direct contracting and best value indicators, as well as the best
contracted manager models fell relatively accessibility from the patients'behind the front runners in their personnel perspective. Thus, in principle, the
satisfaction scores. govemment could purchase from NGOs
(such as those included in this research)The performance in the bidding the preventive, promotional, or simpleprocess, bidding faimess, and clarity and curative services at low additional cost
completeness of the bidding document and with large quality improvements over
varies across different models. The public provision. At the national level,
contracted manager model BPHC private facilities present better qualityperforms the best in this category, than public facilities for all six servicesfollowed by the PKSF contracted NGOs. studied. This offers the prospect forThe BINP/NNP and the UPHCP, which possible contracting-out arrangements.
are both directly run by the govemment of However, the government would have toBangladesh, did not have satisfactory negotiate volume discounts with private
scores. providers to obtain lower price levels that
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are more in line with current public sector discussions with civil society, health
delivery costs. professionals and public officials.
Basically, these recommendations are
4.2. Recommendations related to the establishment of three
independent agencies that will operate as
A. Contract Provisions checks and balances: (1) a Management
Support Agency (MSA) for
The HNPSP will prioritize diversification of diversification of service provision will be
service provision through public-private responsible for contract management.
partnerships as a way to increase coverage Special disbursement financial
and quality of services in the sector. In this management arrangements are
framework, there are a number of recommended to mobilize resources
recommendations for a successful contracting directly from the pool fund and/or other
experience. sources of financing to this contracting
agency; (2) an accreditation agency will
1. Govemment should contract out contract certify minimum operating standards of
management functions in order to non-public HNP providers; (3) the
promote the diversification of service performance monitoring agency will
delivery. The contract design should give supervise, monitor and assess the
considerable autonomy to providers to functioning of each contractor and
implement innovations and allow rapid provide inputs to the MSA for further
adjustments to emerging conditions. contract decisions. The NGO Affairs
Contracts should be linked to tangible Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office as
results and be monitored and evaluated well as the MOHFW would continue to
consistently. The contracting of be responsible for preparing policy
NGO/private organizations should ensure guidelines and promoting information
the receipt of value for money, not only sharing with the above three agencies.
for first and second level health care
services. High quality services must also 3. The report recommends initiating the
be received for other HNP related services contracting out process to NGO/private
and for NGO contracting for community sector, defining services to be contracted,
interventions on nutrition services and identifying and focusing in poor
multisectoral HTV/AIDS activities, underserved areas (upazilas, unions,
demand-side financing options, and facilities) and ensuring quality of services.
capacity building and training. It is recommended that this function be
assigned to a Management Support
2. The diversification of service delivery and Agency (MSA). The MSA should be
the MOHFW's stewardship role are hired through an intemational competitive
complementary. While the GOB bidding process. The DPs would
continues to be financier and provider of participate in the selection committee of
HNP services, it will also strengthen its the procurement process for all agencies
capacity to provide services by involved in the proposed contracting
establishing the legal and institutional arrangements. The MSA will be made
arrangements for the expansion of non- responsible for the management of the
public service providers. pool funds allocated for diversification of
Recommendations for the next sector HNP service provision under special
program are offered in the spirit of financial management arrangements,
encouraging debate and are based on including a separate account. The
quantitative evidence as well as the modality to prepare contracts has been
suggestions of focus groups and improved because other legal and
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institutional arrangements are proposed to 4. Performance-based payment mechanisms
strengthen the govemment's new need to be established, with performance
stewardship role as a purchaser of indicators that clarify what the
services. These would include: a payer/purchaser wants and also provides
supervisory and monitoring body to what the financial incentives to providersfollow-up on the performance of the will be for achieving those targets. We
contracted non-govemment providers, and recommend the implementation of a
an accreditation agency to secure a bonus scheme for providers upon their
minimum level of quality standards from successful achievement of indicators. The
contracted providers. The accreditation bonus criteria will have special provisionsprocess will be voluntary for a defined for incorporating new healthperiod. Thereafter the process would problems/diseases into performancebecome mandatory for all potential monitoring procedures. Weighting the
applicants who apply for MSA funds. proposed performance indicators mayFinally, the formation of a health need adaptation once achievement of an
observatory is recommended. It would existing set of indicators is realized.
operate to advocate and protect the rights
of HNP service users. This new 5. The MSA will conduct a competitive
arrangement is expected to improve bidding process to select the NGOs and
transparency and accountability in the private sector organizations. This process
usage of public funds and to strengthen should be done for clearly defined
the supervision of contracts by means of geographical areas (mainly poorperformance incentives. The consumer's undeserved areas) and service packages.
voice will serve as a check and balance in Each package can vary in terms of the
the delivery of HNP services. This option type of payment mechanisms, andis sustainable in the long-term because the incentives. It might also includeGOB could continue to contract through procurement of goods and commodities as
the MSA using the proposed framework well as incentives to promote investments
and its proper funds if DP funding of NGO/private organizations at thedecreases in the future. health facility level. All payments should
be made on time by the contracting
All matters related to contracting-out agency.
services to NGOs and private providers
should be overseen by a Joint Steering 6. It is recommended that during HNPSPCommittee with representatives from the several experimental pilots be initiated onGOB, the DPs, and civil society. The different contracting modalities toGOB and the DPs will review incorporate supply-side management
nominations and agree jointly on issues of service delivery. To address the
committee members. A set of proposed issues of financial access for the poor and
actions in the areas of contracting financial sustainability concems, some
modalities, contract provision, financial form of equity fund, mechanisms for
settings, regulation, supervision and strengthening community participation,
monitoring are presented in a policy and social control of the health facility
options matrix in Annex 4. It proposes management also should be included.
explicit strategies, the actors involved, Contracts for underserved areas where
which action should be taken, where it patients have a heavy disease burden,
worked, and outlines the potential should consider including higherimplementation risks and bottlenecks. reference prices to avoid sub-optimal
52
Main Messages and Policy Options
quality and service provision. either the MSA (short-term strategy) or
the not-for-profit registered company
7. In those cases where the dispute model (long-term option)40 through the
resolution process is unclear, revisions HNPSP credit. These resources have
should be made to the contract's been proposed as part of category 2
provisions prior to the funding and expenditures in the development credit
commissioning of the NGOs/private agreement between the GOB and the WB.
sector providers under HNPSP. Outside The WB and the GOB will agree on a
experts will act as referees for any timeline for using these resources as well
potential conflict resolution activities. as for setting the adequate legal and
institutional arrangements for proper
B. Contractinig Modalities functioning of these entities.
I. There is no a priori "best possible" C. Laws and Regulations
contracting modality available to the
GOB. Each modality has its strengths and There are a number of instances where the
weaknesses. The report suggests a two- GOB has provided an adequate legal
stage approach be initiated with the framework to engage in NGO contracting
immediate implementation of a modified and other options towards the diversification
private contracting management support of service delivery. However, some pending
agency (MSA). The MSA will be actions remain, including the following:
contracted under competitive basis and
would be financed by the pool fund. This I. The Management Services Agency
will leave open the future option of (MSA) will manage the Diversifying
receiving funds from other DPs and from Service Provision objective within
the government. HNPSP on behalf of the Government of
Bangladesh. The MSA would be
To the extent possible, it will be primarily responsible for efficiently
important to work with communities to administering contracts with non-public
develop their individual contracting providers. The MSA will also contract
arrangements with facilitating CBOs, out activities under demand side financing
which may over time become a duly pilots. The Agency will also support
designated local NGO. While the capacity building efforts for management
supporting evidence is still vague, this of the publicly financed providers.
approach has the best potential for
achieving long-term sustainability of ESP The MSA should ensure value for
service delivery at the community level in money in coordinating budgets with
Bangladesh, and improving social control individual projects and their activities. It
and accountability. This constitutes one also will make decisions on what to
way, although not an exclusive one, to contract out, from whom to purchase
deliver the ESP to hard-to-reach and services, the definition of the contract
marginalized populations. payment option, negotiating the terms of
the contract with the selected provider(s),
2. The establishment of an independent supervising and monitoring the
accreditation agency and monitoring performance of the contracted provider(s),
entity is crucial to ensure quality modifying contracts based on
standards. performance, promoting the formation of
public and private health networks at the
3. Funding modality: the WB trust fund can union level, and contracting providers to
support the contracting process, including deliver demand side financing schemes.
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The MSA will be expected to work weaknesses. In the future, the continuous
collaboratively with its Steering information generated by the performance
Committee (SC) or Board, Performance monitoring agency would serve as keyMonitoring Agency (PMA), the World data to identify the ranking of
Bank, and other stakeholders to deliver NGO/private networks that apply to
those project's outputs for which it is not access and use of public funds.
solely responsible. The GOB and DP
representatives and skilled and recognized 4. Determine a means to retain locally raisedprofessionals from Bangladesh appointed funds from user fees or other userby the GOB and the HNP consortium will charges, and to authorize GOB staff to
conform the MSA's SC. The Board will work for NGOs/private sector under a
oversee MSA activities. The MSA special rule.
manager will provide quarterly reports to
the Board, but the Board will not interfere 5. If quality improvement is to be addressed
with the MSA's independence or make over time, laws will need to be enacted
technical decisions established in its terms that addresses medical malpractice as well
of reference. as the establishment of processes to
resolve such matters. Addressing this2. An HNP observatory will be created to aspect of quality improvement will ensure
oversee consumer rights. The observatory that personal negligence becomes clearly
will be an accreditation body to certify articulated in Bangladesh. It willNGOs' minimum operating standards as facilitate interest in reducing the
well as a monitoring agency to supervise probability that medical errors occur and
the NGOs' performance, These are tolerated by the people. Without ainstitutions will be funded by DP grants, legal basis for defining a negligent act or
and overseen by the MOHFW's Program practice, enforcement of any financial
Support Office (PSO). claim through Bangladesh courts will be
impossible. Any headway in this area3. The processes implemented by a number will require parliamentary action.
of DPs for developing their short listed
NGOs should be assessed in greater detail 6. In summary, this study has shown that
at the outset of the implementation of the contracting private entities for publicforthcoming fINPSP, so as to determine service delivery is a feasible instrument to
the feasibility of implementing a more meet public health goals and to strengthen
formal accreditation entity, and thereby the stewardship role of the MOHFW. In
reduce the NAB's role and its order to diversify service provision, thebureaucratic control over the NGO MOHFW and local govemments need to
registration process. It is therefore develop the capabilities to become activeimportant to determine the relative service purchasers and engage inbenefits and costs of establishing an partnership with NGOs and private
independent accreditation entity as a providers. The pattem of service
vehicle for reducing the lengthy process provision will be adjusted over time as
currently administered by the NAB. Our contracts and commissions increase forbelief, a priori, is that the potential NGOs and private providers to deliverbenefits of accreditation will pay off in primary and secondary care in areas
the long term. In the short to medium where they have shown to have
term, there is some valid information to comparative advantages.
ascertain which NGO/private sector
networks are competent in which areas 7. The MSA management of contracting
and to identify their strengths and should create incentives for improved
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performance and increased accountability, The challenge lies ahead, future benefits
support capacity building efforts, and may will be the result of the decisions and joint
offer a new opportunity for making better efforts made now.
and more efficient use of public
resources. It may also provide the 8. Finally, because of the relative
government with new ways to reach the convenience of contracting NGO/private
poorest. Contracting with public funding sector services, the government may wish
and the DPs TA will require transparent to adopt a mixed strategy whereby some
bidding procedures, well-designed services would continue to be provided in
contracts, specific performance the public sector and others could be
obligations and well-established purchased in the private sector. No matter
procedures for monitoring and evaluation. which strategy the government might
Because the purpose of contracting is to choose, harnessing the private sector
increase the utilization of quality services, participation in the provision of public
the GOB with the assistance of the DPs health services necessarily implies the
need to focus on how to design and strengthening of the regulatory framework
properly implement a mechanism to to guarantee quality standards, cost
contract HNP services, otherwise the risk containment, ensure technical efficiency,
of mismanagement and waste of resources etc., in order to ensure that social
will be latent. objectives continue to be met
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Annex 1: International Review of Contracting Experiences
Contracting is not a new idea. Many In both types of contracting, contractors
countries throughout East and Southern received a budget supplement to dispenseAfrica, which gained their independence from incentives and bonuses to staff.
the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, signed
contracts or had MOUs with non- Evaluation shows that contracting-in
governmental organizations to operate seems not to perform as well as contracting-
hospitals and other PHC facilities throughout out. The Government of Kamataka in India,
their respective countries. The examples of much like Cambodia, contracted-in privateboth Tanzania and Uganda warrant special providers (i.e., NGOs) to manage primary
mention. In Uganda, the MOH seconded health care services within the public sector
certain staff to mission hospitals operated by context. There was very little flexibility. Theboth protestant and catholic churches. The providers operate within the confines of the
MOH also provided tax exemptions for government/civil service rules andimported drugs and other items. In Uganda, regulations. Thus, the contract is too rigid to
where there was no government facility, the allow for innovation.
government provided a budget supplement to
the non-governmental facility, in some Bangladesh also has experienceinstances. And before the restriction contracting HNP services. Under the National
prohibiting a non-government facility in the Integrated Population and Health Program
same area as a public one, the government (NIPHP), supported by USAID, the NIPHP
provided budget supplements to all private directly contracts NGOs to deliver primary
hospital facilities through the respective health care services through NGO clinics.
church organiizations operating those However, under the Urban Primary Healthfacilities.4 ' Care Project (UPHCP) the approach is
slightly different. The GOB contracts-out to
Different countries have used different NGOs through its Project Implementation
modalities for contracting health, nutrition Office. In the case of the National Nutrition
and population (HNP) services. In Cambodia, Project (NNP) and the HIV/AIDS Prevention
for instance, the government piloted two Project (HAPP), which is supported by thefornis of contracting: contracting-inl as well as WB, the MOHFW delegated the management
contracting-out. The contractors in the of the contracting process to UNICEF.
contracting-in districts were given the
responsibility to manage the district health Depending on the country context, using
services. The staff remained government less formal ways of contracting may be more
servants, and medicines and supplies would feasible. In Guatemala, agreements known as
be received via the traditional Ministry of "convenios" were used as the 'contracting
Health logistics system. In the case of the instruments' to sidestep the lengthy
contracted-out districts, the contractors had contracting process and procedures stipulatedfull authority over hiring, firing and paying under the Public Contracting Law. Similarly,
staff, as well as procuring drugs and supplies, in Burkina Faso the government entered into
and for all recurrent operating costs from the quasi-contractual agreements, referred to as
contract funds. The health staff were "Ihnplemtzenttationi Agreements," with their
contracted by the contractors and paid about counterparts in the different regions and
ten times more than their government districts, because the ministry cannot formally
colleagues. contract with its own employees.
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Community contracting is another possible based on an estimated volume of services,
mode of contracting HNP services. while the remaining 50 percent was case-
Community contracting is procurement by or based reimbursement. Each month the
on behalf of a community. It has the potential contractor would invoice the Ministry of
to improve transparency and lowers costs Health for the balance as determined by the
compared to centralized bidding. The Malawi legally established case-based charges. This
Social Action Fund (MASAF) is an example strategy inherently encourages increased
of community contracting. It is a quick- volume, sometime to the extent that the
disbursing facility that routes money directly provider has the incentive to undertake more
to communities and assists communities in activities than specified as long as a greater
contracting health services, and water supply flow of revenue results. Moreover, this
and sanitation. Similarly in Peru, Local approach is likely to encourage providers to
Health Administration Associations (known increase volume in those services that entail
as CLAS) were formed and comprised mainly greater profit margins, and neglect the less
of community members. These associations well-reimbursed services. As a result, a high
are self-administered organizations, which degree of monitoring is required for this type
receive funds directly from the Ministry of of payment mechanism, and therefore, the
Health and sign contracts with regional health transaction costs are much higher.
authorities for the delivery of HNP services
according to their own local health plans. The fee-for-service mechanism generates
higher transaction costs as well. The
The payment mechanism used for providers have no incentive to reduce costs as
compensating providers has a significant they are reimbursed in full. As can be seen
potential to influence the performance of the from the case of Zimbabwe, the fee-for-
providers and hence the outcomes. The service system and the failure to exempt the
introduction of incentives to reward good eligible patients properly prevented adequate
performance and the use of sanctions in case cost control. However, some variations in this
of non-performance are important measures in method can be made, for instance by capping
shaping the providers' performance. The the maximum number of episodes that can be
challenge for the purchaser/contracting billed during a specified period. The
agency is to choose the right payment strategy Romanian govemment piloted a scheme of
to best achieve the desired goals. output-based contracting between doctors and
district health authorities. The payment to
In Guatemala, the providers would receive doctors combined capitation (fixed payment
advance capitated payments based on the based on their patient list) and reimbursement
population size covered in the particular for about thirty fee-for-service health related
geographical area. The payment would cover items. Capitation was increased for doctors
direct costs plus administration expenses. who worked in remote areas, and reduced for
This is a fairly low cost method, and caps doctors not providing services at night and/or
costs effectively. Furthermore, it is easy to on weekends.
administer and particularly useful where the
contracting agency has limited experience The ability to raise and retain user fees at
and/or ability in contracting. However, the the facility level should be considered when
disadvantage is that it may lead to lower contracting HNP services. Under the UPHC
quality and "cream skinmiiIing" of patients. project in Bangladesh, NGOs recover about
20 to 30 percent of their costs through user
An approach similar to the cost and fees. In the case of Bolivia, a strategy of
volume method of payment was introduced in cross-subsidization was implemented,
Colombia. In this case, 50 percent of the whereby those who could afford to pay
payment was prospective per-capita payment subsidized the services for those who could
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not. Also, the fee received for curative care against pre-determined categories. A
services subsidized the fee for preventive minimum score needs to be achieved to
services. Furthermore, revenue from clinics receive bonuses.
in better-off areas was used to subsidize the
clinics in the poorer areas. However in some In the Urban Primary Health Care Project
cases, such as in the case of Karnataka, of Bangladesh, the providers (i.e. the partner
contractors cannot charge user fees that are NGOs) are paid on a cost-based financing
not normally levied in a public facility. In the system. Performance is linked to payment
absence of the ability to raise user fees, an such that NGOs have the opportunity to earnNGO contractor can have difficulty raising a an additional bonus of up to 6 percent
substantial part of the operating budget. depending on health impact made in the area
covered. Bolivia introduced an innovativeAn expenditure-based financing financial incentive scheme of fee-sharing with
mechanism, whereby the contractors are physicians. The doctors were encouraged to
reimbursed for expenses upon submission of work weekends by offering them a higher
cost reports, may not be the best approach. proportion of revenues generated onThe contractor has no incentive to become weekends compared to weekdays. A risk-
more efficient, to improve management or to sharing incentive scheme was introduced for
reduce costs below the maximum permitted specialists. A fee per visit was established for
ceiling, as they are reimbursed in full for the physician specialty services. The fee was
reported expenditures. Payment is not tied to shared 50/50 between the contractor and the
the achievement of results, and therefore doctor.
contractors are not motivated to improve
performance. Incentives can also be non-financial in
nature, such as the case of the NGOs involvedUnder the Haiti Health Systems project, an in urban immunization in Bangladesh. There
expenditure-based financing system failed to was no explicit contract signed for the
achieve the desired goals. Later the project provision of services, and the NGOs were notintroduced a performance-based financing given any additional money or resources for
mechanism whereby contractors were conducting the immunizations and
contracted to work under a fixed price, award immunization campaigns. The NGOs onlyfee type of contract. NGOs would get 95 received the vaccines, supplies and somepercent of their target budget to meet the training, and that provided the incentive for
agreed service delivery goals, with payments becoming involved in the program. Similarly,
issued at intervals. A performance incentive in the Nepal TB control program, the NGOs
of 10 percent of the target budget is given to involved are not contractors in the strict sense
contractors when all targets are substantially of the term as there is no official contract
met. That results in an extra 5 percent over the other than registering the facility as a Directly
target budget for the contractor. While, Observed Treatment (DOT) program facility.failure to meet the targets results in an The NGOs or private providers do not receiveincentive reduction, which usually means that any financial assistance from the government.
no incentive payment is given to the The participating providers' major incentive is
contractor and projected operation costs are the signboards confirming that they are
reduced by about 5 percent. In Nicaragua, the accredited by the National TB Program.Ministry of Health signed performance
agreements with the hospitals and health A strong and effective monitoring and
centers. Each agreement clearly specified the evaluation (M&E) system, for both technical
actions to be taken and the goals to be as well as financial aspects, is an important
achieved, as well as the system for monitoring requirement for contracting to work
achievements and measuring the performance successfully. Ideally, M&E is accompanied
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by provider incentives and sanctions. A improving access, including in such areas as
strong M&E system is therefore necessary to mother child care, primary care and curative
track providers' performance in order to link care. For example, most governments in
performance with payment. In Costa Rica, Central America have chosen contracting-out
the COOPESALUD's M&E system has been to NGOs to expand primary health care
evaluated and considered to be a very strong coverage in rural areas where public providers
system. M&E in that initiative was seen as a are absent or where some population groups
key activity. The contracts include a list of are too remote to have effective access to
indicators to gauge performance as well as an govemment-provided care. Additionally,
evaluation protocol defining all the necessary access is also the dimension that researchers
details. Ideally, the M&E system should have most frequently examined in order to
focus on explicit output-based and outcome- assess the performance impact of contracting-
based targets rather than specifying the out primary health care services.
processes. Those targets should be specified
clearly in the contracts. There is substantial While Mills and Bloomberg (1998) show
evidence that contracting-out positively that contracting of ancillary services can
improves access to priority health services, initially save 20 to 30 percent of costs, an
i.e., access is measured in terms of coverage, assessment of savings in clinical services is
availability, and quantity of services provided more difficult to undertake. Limited
(Lui, 2004). In addition, Loevinson and information from the United States on such
Harding (2004) found that in a sample of six contracting indicates the establishment of
projects, private contractors were more long-term relations based on trust, an ensuing
effective in increasing access to health decline of competitive tenders, and the
services than the government. decreasing importance of prices after the first
round of contracting. Initial contracting is
These favorable results can be explained in competitive, but renegotiation is not.
part due to the efforts that many contracting- Information from the United Kingdom points
out projects have concentrated directly on in the same direction.
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Annex 2: Evaluation of NGO Contracting Models In Bangladesh
Sample of Health Service Facility/Center by NGOs
(Including NNP, BBF, Dhaka Ahsania Mission)
Model Name of NGOs No. of Filled-in Questionnaires No. of
Visited
Center
Form A: Exit Form B Form C: Total
Interview with NGO Interview of
clients Facility Facility
< -- Survey Personnel--
Model 1: UPHCP and NNP UPHCP: S P 
- -(Directly managed by GOB) Marie Stopes 90 3 9-- 102 3
PCC - - 69 7 3 - 2  84 - 3
Mamata - l - 75 - 3 12 1 90 3
pNNP: ( 
_
SHED 98 4 100 8 ; 4-
HEED 91 4 8 103 4
Bangladesh 
_____--_
TMSS 96 4 I_ - 1 I4
BBF 0 0 0 . 3
Sub-tal 
- 519 21 
_60 600 24
Model 2: NSDP and BPHC 
- NSDP: -
-
(Service delivery through NGOs PSKP 
- 75 3 12 90 3
and contracted manager) 
.3
JTS 88 3 20 111 3
Mamata 72 __ 3 --12 387 - -3
BPHC: ---
FNan_Moitree 7 __ 3 - .9 83 3
Al Falah 27 1 5 . 33 1
Bangladesh 
_ - - -- 40 13
Sub-total 333 13 58 404 13
Model 3: Autonomous Trust Dhaka Ahsania 25 1 4 30 1(Service delivery through Mission I
Autonomous Trust)
Grameen Kallyan 71 3 12 86 3
Sub-total 96 .4 16 116 4
Model 4: Large NGOs delivernng AC 187 7 23 217 8
PHC
I K 59 3 1 1 73 3
Gona Shaysthaya 30 1 5 36
Kendra
Sub-total T - 276 |- 1t 39 - 326 
- 12
Model 5: PKSF and SD No organization has been selected under the PKSF model as it is not(Not-for-profit registered company) contracting any NGO for any health service delivery activities.
However, DSK & TMSS received micro-credit support from PKSF.
Total i224 1 49 - t 73 1 446 5 3
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Annex 2 (continued): Evaluation of NGO Contracting Models In
Bangladesh
Sample of Health Service Facility/Center by NGOs
(Without centers of NNP, BBF, and Dhaka Ahsania Mission)
Model Name of NGOs No. of Filled-in Questionnaires No. of
Visited
Center
Form A: Form B: Form C: Total
Exit NGO Interview of
Interview Facility Facility
with clients Survey Personnel
Model 1: UPHCP UIPIICP:
(Directly managed by GOB) Marie Stopes 90 3 9 102 3
PCC 69 3 12 84 3
Mamata 75 3 12 90 3
Sub-total 234 9 33 276 9
Model 2: NSDP and BPHC NSDP:
(Service delivery through PSKP 75 3 12 90 3
NGOs and contracted manager)
JTS 88 3 20 II I 3
Mamata 72 3 12 87 3
BPHC:
Nan Moitree 71 3 9 83 3
Al Falah 27 1 5 33 1
Bangladesh
Sub-total 333 13 58 404 13
Model 3: Autonomous Trust Grameen Kallyan 71 3 12 86 3
(Service delivery through
Autonomous Trust)
Sub-total 71 3 12 86 3
Model 4: Large NGOs BRAC 90 3 11 104 3
delivering PHC
DSK 59 3 1 1 73 3
Gona Shaysthaya 30 1 5 36
Kendra
Sub-total 179 7 27 213 7
Model 5: PKSF and SD No organization has been selected under the PKSF model as it is not
(Not-for-profit registered contracting any NGO for any health service delivery activities. However, DSK
company) & TMSS received micro-credit support from PKSF.
Total 817 32 130 979 | 32
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ANNEX 2 (continued): Evaluation of Ngo Contracting Models In
Bangladesh
Sample of NNP Centers
Model Name of NGOs No. of filled-in questionnaires No. of
Visited
Center
Form A: Form B: Form C: Total
Exit NGO Interview of
Interview Facility Facility
with clients Survey Personnel
Model 1: NNP NNP:
(Directly managed by GOB) SHED 98 4 8 110 4
HEED Bangladesh 91 4 8 103 4
TMSS 96 4 11 III 4
Sub-total 285 12 27 324 12
Model 3: Autonomous Trust Dhaka Ahsania 25 130(Service delivery through Mission (DAM)
Autonomous Trust)
Sub-total 25 1 4 30 1
Model 4: Large NGOs NNP:
delivering PHC
BRAC 97 4 12 113 4
Sub-total 97 4 12 113 4
Total (NNP) 382 16 39 437 16
Total (DAM) 25 1 4 30 1
Grand Total 407 17 43 467 17
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of Public and Private Providers in Bangladesh
1. Evaluation dimensions: perceived quality, technical quality, price, accessibility, cost, perceived
value and derived value
2. Sampling ofpublic, private for-profit and private not-for-profit facilities.
A sample of health facilities in four districts in public), and the upazila level at the primary
Bangladesh included 50 facilities. The sample care facilities (8 public, 16 private for profits
was designed to provide estimates for the and 8 NGOs). A three multi-stage sampling
national level at the foremost tertiary hospitals design was employed to draw information from
(2 public and 4 private), the district level at the each of the represented levels. Data collection
general acute care hospitals (4 public and 8 instruments included the following:
Table 3A. Inventory of Data Collection Instruments
Instrument Respondent Dimensions observed
0-D -~ -O Oo :.
>
> > -
1. Facility questionnaire 4 Person in charge of the X X X X X
_______________________facility
2.a Exit poll for Outpatient who already X X X X X X
outpatients4 3  received services
2.b Exit poll for inpatients Inpatients prone to be X X X X X X
discharged
3. Direct observation * (6 Direct observation X X X
sub-questionnaires - one (outpatients) Medical
for each service selected)44 records inspection
(inpatients) .
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Annex 3 (continued): Value Derived for Six Selected Services
Figure 3A. Value Derived for ARI
High quality at a
high cost Highest value
100 Upazila Private
National Private
80- District Private
o 60 - NGO 0 * District PublicUC
X 40 Upaala Public
o 201
National Public
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lowest value Low quality at aCost score low cost
Source: Facility Survey, Exit Poll Outpatients, Exit Poll Inpatients; Direct Observation:Antenatal Care; Direct Observation: ARI; and Direct Observation: Hypertension,(Bitran and Associates, 2004).
Figure 3B. Value Derived for Antenatal Care
High quality at a
high cost Highest value
100 p
District Public
80 1 District Private
NGO
e 60X1:
| National Private
Upazila Private
20 j Upazila Public
National Public
0 I I
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lowest value Cost score Low quality at a
low cost
Source: Facility Survey, Exit Poll Outpatients, Exit Poll Inpatients; Direct Observation:Antenatal Care; Direct Observation: ARI; and Direct Observation: Hypertension,(Bitran and Associates, 2004).
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Figure 3C. Value Derived for Hypertension
High quality at a
high cost Highest value
100 - - --
80 -
National Private
0 O- NGO
District Public District Prvate
40 ' Upazila Public Upazila Private
National Public
20
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lowest value Cost score Low quality at alow cost
Source: Facility Survey, Exit Poll Outpatients, Exit Poll Inpatients; Direct Observation:
Antenatal Care; Direct Observation: ARI; and Direct Observation: Hypertension, (Bitran and
Associates, 2004).
Table 3B Outpatient quality (percent)
Upazila District National
Public Private NGO Public Private Public Private
Was explained diagnostic 80 91 100 94 89 85 100
Women attended by female doctor 11 20 66 45 31 36 65
Bothered by not being attended by female doctor 24 18 0 0 23 11 0
Declared treated with courtesy by staff 87 99 99 89 93 77 98
Rank cleanness of waiting room (percent)
Clean 32 48 62 26 65 48 75
Regular 64 49 38 64 34 48 25
Dirty 3 3 0 11 1 5 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Rank cleanness of consultation room (percent
Clean 58 58 82 38 80 75 80
Regular 41 42 18 62 20 25 20
Dirty 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Rank cleanness of toilets (percent
Clean 10 25 35 6 29 15 44
Regular 41 43 38 29 36 15 31
Dirty 14 2 0 38 2 35 0
Did not use it 34 30 28 27 33 35 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Facility Survey of Public and Private Providers, 2004.
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Table 3C Facility quality (percent)
Upazila District National
Public Private NGO Public Private Public PrivateOwnership status of facility (%)
Own 100 25 13 100 75 100 100
Rented 0 75 88 0 25 0 0
Tota I 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Main source of drinking water (%)
Piped water 13 0 25 0 0 50 75
Tank 38 19 0 0 13 0 0
Hand pump/deep tube well 50 81 75 100 88 50 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Main source of electricity (%)
Public electricity 50 38 100 50 38 0 0
Public & generator 50 63 0 50 63 100 100
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sewerage system of the facility (%)
Sewer 13 6 0 0 0 50 75
Septic tank 88 94 100 100 75 0 25
Pots regularly emptied 0 0 0 0 25 50 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% separate toilets for men and women 100 75 38 75 75 100 100Cleanliness and functionality rating of toilets(%)
Dirty 0 0 13 50 0 0 0
Regular 100 81 75 50 88 100 25
Clean 0 19 13 0 13 0 75
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Location of most toilets (%)
Attached to wards/rooms 100 93 100 100 100 100 100
Detached outside 0 7 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Overall maintenance status of the facility (%)
Very well maintained 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
Well maintained 25 25 88 50 50 50 75
Somewhat maintained 75 75 13 50 38 50 0
No maintenance in last 3 months 0 0 0 0 13 0 0
Rundown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Channel for appointments (%)
Call in by phone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comes earlier to make appointment 25 38 0 0 13 50 25
Justwalk in 63 56 100 100 88 50 75
Referring doctors 13 6 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Organization of appointments
First come-first serve 100 88 100 100 88 100 100
By disease severity 0 13 0 0 13 0 0
Tota I 100 100 100 100 100 100 100% with staff trained in patient handling issues 13 0 75 33 43 0 75covered in training
Counselling (%) 0 0 50 33 43 0 75
Personal hygiene (%) 13 0 50 0 14 0 25
Customer service (%) 0 0 25 0 14 0 50
Respect of religion (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Sensitivity to gender issues (%) 0 0 25 0 0 0 0
Others (%) 13 0 13 0 0 0 0
% policy for female patients 13 6 0 0 0 0 0
% keeps daily patients records 100 50 100 100 75 100 100
% keeps medical records for all patients 75 38 88 50 50 50 75
% provides doctors with medical records 38 31 88 50 63 0 75
% do outreach activities 13 0 75 33 0 0 0
Provide patients' needs for diagnostic and
treatment (%) I
Yes 0 0 25 0 25 0 50
No 38 93 75 25 63 0 25
Sometimes 63 7 0 75 13 100 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% where patient must bring -
Drugs 100 88 75 75 75 100 50
Medical supplies 75 88 75 50 75 100 50
Linen 0 13 0 50 13 0 0
Other 0 13 0 0 25 0 25
% written medical protocol 25 0 63 25 25 100 100
% protocol available to all medical 100 nd 100 100 100 100 100
staff I
Source: Facility Survey of Public and Private Providers, 2004
Table 3D Facility median prices (tk) -
Upazila District National
Public Private NGO Public Private Public Private
Outpatient consultation 3 90 10 4 200 5 100
Follow-up consultation NA 50 10 NA 100 NA 100
Specialist consultation 3 200 20 NA 200 5 25'
Complete Blood Count 20 90 20 NA 100 30 175
Stool R/MIE test 10 30 20 NA 28 20 35
Urine test 10 30 20 NA 28 20 35
Chest X-ray 54 100 NA 50 120 50 110
Abdomen X-ray 54 100 NA 50 120 50 110
Ultrasounds test 150 350 NA 220 350 160 650
Inpatient day NA 100 NA NA 175 NA 300
Normal delivery NA 1000 NA NA 1500 NA 1750
Cesarean section NA 5500 NA NA 4100 NA 7500
Minor surgery NA 750 50 NA 2400 NA 1750
NA Not available; *Not significant
Table 3E Outpatients Accessibility
Upazila District National
Public Private NGO Public Private Public Private
Total of interviews 90 176 144 66 122 40 80
Distance traveled (km) 3.9 4.8 1.9 5.5 11.3 8.9 16.7
Travel time (minutes) 38 25 16 32 40 46 54
Type of transport (percent )
Public bus 10 12 3 12 32 38 23
Private motor vehicle 3 6 7 9 11 15 36
Bicycle 1 2 1 2 3 0 0
Riksha 33 32 47 52 43 30 36
On foot 29 13 35 20 3 5 0
Other 23 35 6 6 7 13 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Reason for choosing the facility (percent )
Been here before 21 22 45 22 23 40 43Close to home 37 28 18 24 14 20 8Appreciate quality 7 11 10 17 10 5 8Doctor has good reputation 13 23 12 15 22 10 20Referred 14 15 13 19 27 15 23
Doesn't know any other facility 3 0 20 2 1 0 0
Other 4 1 2 2 3 10 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100With appointment (%) 1 15 0 8 10 13 19Attended at appointed time (%) 0 52 Nd 100 58 0 53Waiting time (minutes) 29 36 12 22 31 53 32Think waiting time is acceptable (%) 58 66 89 69 64 32 60Acceptable waiting time (minutes) 23 26 18 21 25 17 20
Source: Exit poll of outpatients of public and private providers, 2004
Table 3F Facilities Access
Upazila District National
Public Private NGO Public Private Public Private
Distance
Average distance to three nearest facilities (km) 2,0 0,9 2,3 2,1 1,1 1,6 1,7Distance to nearest facility most used by patients(km) 1,5 0,7 2,2 2,0 1,6 1,7 1,8
Type of three closest facilities (percent) X
Public 8 31 45 11 33 33 8
Private 88 67 55 89 67 7 92
NGO 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Days per week open (percent )
6 days 88 0 100 50 50 100 75
7 days 13 100 0 50 50 0 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hours per day open (percent L 
-
24 hours 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
12:00 to 23:59 hours 0 13 0 0 0 0 25
8:00 to 11:59 hours 0 50 50 0 50 0 0
6:00 to 7:59 hours 63 6 50 75 13 100 75
Less than 6 hours 38 25 0 25 38 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average hours per day open 5,6 9,0 7,8 5,9 6,9 6,2 7,6
Attends emergencies (percent) 100 75 50 100 63 100 100
Attends emergencies 24x7 (percent) 100 50 25 100 63 100 100
Time most patients come (percent )
Morning 100 79 100 100 50 100 50
Lunch time 0 7 0 0 0 0 0
Afternoon 0 7 0 0 50 0 25
No significant difference during the day 0 7 0 0 0 0 25
Total 100 100 1000 100 100Source: Facility survey of public and private providers, 2004
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Table 3G ARI direct unit costs
Upazila District National NGO
Public Private Public Private Public Private
1 Total (tk) (2+3+4+5) 33.3 31.8 32.4 66.6 66.4 66.5 19.4
By type of input (tk)
2 Building (8) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
3 Labor (16) 8.2 5.4 6.4 5.7 6.2 6.0 2.3
4 Drugs (46) 5.8 6.9 6.5 18.2 9.1 12.2 6.1
5 Exams (57) 19.1 19.4 19.2 42.6 51.0 48.1 10.9
Source: Direct observation survey 2004
Table 3H Antenatal care direct unit costs
-
Upazila District National NGO
Public Private Public Private Public Private
1 Total (tk) (2+3+4+5) 116.1 262.1 178.9 117.3 284.8 365.2 107.1
By type of input (tk)
2 Building (8) 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
3 Labor (16) 12.0 7.4 12.4 5.1 5.1 8.7 4.2
4 Drugs (46) 37.2 32.6 5.5 0.0 0.0 9.6 67.6
5 Exams (57) 66.7 221.9 160.5 112.0 279.4 346.8 35.0
Source: Direct observation survey 2004
Table 31 Hypertension direct unit costs
Upazila District National NGO
Public Private Public Private Public Private
1 Total (tk) (2+3+4+5) 90.9 151.3 150.8 156.9 533.6 612.0 45.3
By type of input (tk)
2 Building (8) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
3 Labor (16) 13.2 5.2 7.0 4.9 2.0 6.4 5.0
4 Drugs (46) 3.8 35.5 0.9 1.3 1.5 426.1 34.6
5 Exams (57) 73.7 110.4 142.6 150.7 529.9 179.4 5.3
Source: Director observation survey 2004
75
NGO Contracting Evaluation for the HNP Sector in Bangladesh
ANNEX 4. Alternative Contracting-out Modalities
Figure IV.1 Private Management Service Agent Model
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Figure IV.2 Direct GOB Management Model
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Figure IV.3 Modified Direct GOB Management Model
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Figure IV.4 Modified Non-Profit Registered Company Model
Development
Partner (DP) GOB
Fulnd F unds &
Representation / Representation
Performrance
er \m information Information
Pertormancecer \tanonaton /
Mlonitoring Non-Profit Accreditanon
AgencN (PMtA) Registered
Supervision 
Quality &
& 
Standard
Monitoring 79 ate GOPae
Network I Netwvork 2 Network 3
79
NGO Contracting Evaluation for the HNP Sector in Bangladesh
Figure IV.5: NGO Foundation
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Figure IV.6 Modified NGO Foundation Model
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ANNEX 5: Summary of Issues and Suggested Policy Options
AREAS STRATEGIES WHO IS WHAT TO DO WHERE RISKS AND(POLICY INVOLVED (ACTIONS) DID IT BOTTLENECKS
OPTIONS) (ACTORS) WORK?
(EXPERIE
l_ NCES)
Contracting Reaching the poor NGO Establishment of Bangladesh Periodic surveys are
modality Community "equity" targets to not carried out
reach a defined together with benefit
proportion of poor incidence analysis to
households measure the access to
services and financing
by the poor
Fees exemptions NGO Health cards given to Colombia
Community the poor as identified Peru
by CG and/or proxy
nmean tests
Contract User fees linked NGO management To include it in the Cambodia
provision with incentive staff of NGO contracts
lpayments providers
Contracts include NGO management To include it in the Cambodia
funds for medical MSA/non profit contract
equipment and registered company
procurement of
goods by
contractor
Bonus subject to NGO To be included in the Bangladesh
performance up to PMA contract (ADB, Urban
an additional 6% MSA/NPRC Primary
of contract value Health Care
depending on Project)
health impacts in
coverage area
Training NGO To include it in the N/A BMA may resist
component of APP contracts, an in-house
NGO contracts training component.
Training for Doctors DP funds Albania
primary health care NGO networks
doctors working in
NGO networks
under contracts.
Essential drug list NGO/PSO/MSA,/NP To be included in the Albania
RC contracts
TA assistance to NGO TA to be coordinated N/A Limited capacity ofNGOs in strategic PSO/MOHFW by PSO/MOHFW PSO team
planning, financial
management,
pricing, costing
and revenue
analysis, HR,
quality control, etc. 
.
Financial Payment NGO Capitation Cambodia Lack of a strong
settings mechanisms MSA/NPRC Bonus incentive to staff Chile supervision and
and organization for Brazil evaluation system
good performance USA
Kyrgyzstan
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AREAS STRATEGIES WHO IS WHAT TO DO WHERE RISKS AND
(POLICY INVOLVED (ACTIONS) DID IT BOTTLENECKS
OPTIONS) (ACTORS) WORK?
(EXPERIE
NCES) l
Bonus to staff NGO staff 1 00% bonus added for Romania
staff practicing in
remote or low-income
areas, and additional
financial incentive for
higher professional
qualifications.
Laws and Enact law to BMA Pass and approve law Most Resistance from
Regulation address medical MOHFW in the Parliament countries in BMA.
malpractice Parliament the world, If law is approved, it
Users especially may be difficult to be
Consumer rights Europe and enforced
groups the Americas
Doctor rural BMA Pass and approve law South Asian Not very likely
service law MOHFW in the parliament countries,
LAC and
others.
Retention of users NGO MOF should enact the Cambodia, Agreement between
fees by NGOs MOHFW norm allowing for this Thailand. MOF and MOHFW,
MOF Bangladesh poor management of
Latin retained funds at the
American local level
Countries and
others.
Procedure manual NGO MOHFW should enact Peru Full compliance of the
for the functioning MOHFW the norm Bangladesh norms, given
of CBO management
flexibility to CBO
Authorizing GOB GOB staff Legal norm cleared by Cambodia
staff to be on leave MOHFW the Prime Minister
and to w ork in MOE
NGOs/private
organizations
Establishing the NGO Contracting out the Cambodia GOB may not support
procedures for MSA/NPRC/MOHF dispute resolution the action
formial resolution W services to an
of disputes interinational firm
between the NGO
contractor,
MOHFW and the
Contracting
agency
Accreditation NGO nctworks To be prepared by South Africa No interest shown by
agency (NAAH) NGO providers MOHFW with the Thailand relevant GOB
NISA rNPRC/MOHF assistance of DP, and Egypt departments
W approved by Prime Brazil Opposition from
Users Minister Zambia NGOs
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AREAS STRATEGIES WHO IS WHAT TO DO WHERE RISKS AND(POLICY INVOLVED (ACTIONS) DID IT BOTTLENECKS
OPTIONS) (ACTORS) WORK?
(EXPERIE
NCES)
Supervision HNP observatory Consumer groups To bc prepared by Opposition from
and to protect and NGO MOHFW with the BMA and MOHFW
evaluation oversee consumer MOHFW assistance of DP, aridrights approved by Prime
Minister
Creation of the NGO Designed by MOHFW Opposition from NGOPerformance MOHFW with the assistance of and MOHFWMonitoring DP.
Agency (PMA)
Formation of NGO Registration of CG as BangladeshCommunity boards MOHFW non-profit institutions Senegal(community and transfer Sub-Saharangroups) in the management of the Madagascar
community clinics health facility and all Malawi
related assets to them.
Performance-based MSA/NPRC/NGO A weighted score Nicaraguafinancing systcm based on agreed Guatemala
agreements and categorics and weights Costa Rica
supervision Supervision and Haiti
evaluation plan are to
be included in the
contracts
Local authorities MSA/NPRC/NGO/ Each district has an Burkina Fasogiven budget to MOHFW implementation
carry out their agreement with the
work programs MOHFW
Drug and policy MOHFW To be created. Albania Interest groups
committee NGO dominate the
committee
' In Laos, the World Bank with Belgium Aid and the Swiss Red Cross demonstrated the benefits of contracting
with NGOs.
2 R. Taylor, Harding and Preker, eds., 2003, p. 157.
" Cambodia, Shahrzad, 2004, and Dunlop, Cambodia paper, 2004.
4 World Bank, 1993.
5 Chaudhury, N. and J. S. Hammer, Ghost Doctors: Absenteeismi in Bangladeshi Health Facilities, ResearchWorking Paper 3065, World Bank, May 2003.
6 Service Delivery Survey, CIET, 2003.
Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
Harding and Preker eds., Private Participation in Health Services, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2003.
9 The administrative structure of the country includes 6 divisions, 64 districts, 496 upazilas, and 4451 unions.
'° Field survey instruments utilized in the study are available at www.health-swap2.com.
I ]An Evaluation of NGO contracting in Bangladesh: Contracting NGO for the delivery of health services, AUSHealth International in association with ADSL. Report commissioned by the World Bank, November 2004.12 Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 describes the characteristics of several modalities of NGO service delivery.Additional information can be found in C. Cummings et al., March 2004.
13 Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
4 Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
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'5 The following is based on survey results of NGO facilities, health care providers of NGO facilities, and users
of NGO services, which was carried out as part of the study. See Annex I. In total, the survey team visited 53
health centers of the selected 16 NGOs to collect information from facility personnel (173 interviews) and clients
(1,224 exit interviews). A comparative analysis was made of 32 health centers with comparable data, including
817 exit interviews with users and 130 facility personnel interviews.
Ih Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
t7Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
3 User satisfaction level of NGOs compared to public and private sector are shown in Annex 3.
"9 Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, HEU, MOHFW, 2003.
2" The NGO facility personnel survey included 130 interviews w\ith NGO personnel to obtain information about
their opinions on service delivery and the NGO's practices. Out of these 130 personnel, 84 were service
providers, including physicians, nurses, midwife, etc.
21 All the quality scores were used to calculate the average score. The average score was multiplied by 10 to
arrive at a range from 0 to 100 for the aggregate value.
22 Household, Income and Expenditure Survey 2000.
23 RDP Medi Vision Intemational, Bangladesh Urbant Primary, Health Care Project-2, Midterm Report and
Situation .Anal'vsis, Project Preparation Technical Assistance PPTA 4165, (Zeist, The Netherlands: for the GOB
and the ADB by RDP Medi Vision Intemational, April 2004).
24 See Section 6 below for additional discussion regarding this issue of fee legality.
25 Comments of Prof. Mynuddin, Legal Counsel to the Dhaka Office of the World Bank, July 27, 2004.
26 See MOP. The Proceduresfor Iniplementationi of the Public Prociurement Regulations, 2003, (Dhaka: GOB.
March 2004).
2 See G. Angeles, P. Hutchinson and S. N., Mitra, 2001 Urban Family Health Partnership Evaluation Sunrey,
(Chapel Hill, NC: Measure Evaluation and Mitra and Associates, February 2003).
28 See David Dunlop, "Financing and Cost of Child health Care in Cambodia, Circa 2004: Are We Out of
Balance?," draft paper prepared for URC/USAID, (Phnom Phen: URC, May 16, 2004). In this analysis the
author was able to document the fact that administrative overhead costs amounted to about 50% of the total cost
of PFIC ser\ ice delivery in a rural based PHC clinic/health center.
29 For detailed information see "Comparative advantages of public and private providers in health care service in
terms of cost," Bitran & Associates, WB/HPSO, December, 2004.
"' See Chris Cummings, et al., Scoping Stiudy of Potential Mechanismsfor Strategic Financinig ofNGO
Provision of Education aInd Health Services, (Dhaka: Options/DFID, March 2004).
3' These entities include: HLSP, PHD/BPHC, and NICARE funded mainly by DFID, NSDP (USAID), Save the
Children USA currently funded by GFATM and possibly by USAID, and UNICEF a UN organization, funded
by the MOH via the WB HAPP project.
32 These NGOs include BRAC, TMSS, and undoubtedly others as well.
This concept has been discussed in several reports and documents. See the following materials: B. Foseberg
and J. Sundewall, Contributions to thle HNPSP Plainiiig, (Stockholm: Karolinska Institute, June 30, 2004); and
S. M. Jahangir, "NGOs to Come Under Regulatory Framework," Finaincial Erpress, vol. 11, no. 234, July 14,
2004,
34 Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1999-2001, lEU, MOHFW, 2003.
35 The three-year community pilot program suggested by the MOHIFW includes a technical assistance (TA) team
responsible for contracting on the MOHFW's behalf following the GOB procurement regulations. This TA team
would be supervised by a Community Clinic Program Implementation Committee (CCPIC) which will establish
the TA team, approve NGO selection, secure inter-ministerial and inter-agency coordination and liaise with DPs.
The program envisions the formation of a local Community Clinic Management Group (CCMG) with
community member representatives. The CCMG would continue to operate the CCs. The CCMG would sign a
MOU with the MOHFW at the union level and above, and local NGOs would support the contracting process.
(M. M. Shawkat Ali, Chris Minnett, Md. Osman Ali, Community Clinic Pilot Programme, DFID support to the
MOHFW, August 2004).
36 See Mokbul Morshed Ahmed, "The State, Laws and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
Bangladesh," InterniationalJouiinal of Not-for-Profit Law, 3 3 (March 2001).
3 See Chapter 4 in A. Harding and A. Preker eds., 2003 for a more detailed review of regulatory mechanism that
have been applied and what they have achieved.
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l8 As of January 1, 2004, the PPP/NICARE approach had been implemented in 41 community clinics, with an
additional 29 sites targeted for implementation during 2004. They would like to expand to 200 sites to fully testthis approach. See PPP/NICARE, Proposals for Functioning of Coinmunit Clinics Based onGO/NGO/Co,inninitY Partnership, (Dhaka: NICARE, about July, 2004).
39 The Program Support Office (PSO) will be located in and managed by the MOHFW to promote and support
the implementation of the HNPSP. The GOB and the WB have agreed to this as part of the implementation
arrangement of the HNPSP support.
40 In the meantime, the proposed NGO Foundation will need to follow up on recommendations proposed by this
study to ensure transparency and to reduce the prospect of inappropriate fund diversions.
4! See David Dunlop, Tlhe Economtics of Health Service Delii'erv in Uganda: Imtplications for Health andEconomic Planning, Ph.D. dissertation, (East Lansing, Ml: Michigan State University. December 1973).
42 Provides a description of the facility. It was composed of six subsections: Main facility survey, services
utilization section. staffing section. infrastructure and equipment section, drugs and supplies section, and
recurrent costs.
43 Infonration was collected directly from the facility's users regarding their socio-demographic characteristics,level of satisfaction with the service received, expenses incurred (both formal and informal payments) and thefacility's accessibility for them. Outpatients generally were interviewed outside the facilities and sometimes inthe waiting rooms.
44 Outpatient care: Antenatal Care (reproductive care and essential component of the ESP), ARI (child care -ESP), Hypertension (adult care - ESP). Inpatient care: Severe Diarrhea (Non-surgical curative care - ESP),Normal (Vaginal) Delivery (maternal care - ESP), Caesarean section (surgical intervention and maternal care -ESP). Data on the direct medical services received by outpatients was collected by observing the treatmentprotocol of a sample of outpatients at the selected facilities. Inforiation on direct medical services, drugs and
supplies received by inpatienits wvere collected primarily from medical records of a sample of patients who had
completed treatment and were waiting to be discharged. Some information was also collected through interviews
with patients, and in some cases. interviews with the attending relatives/friends.
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